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ABSTRACT
The American University Cairo
Till‘ Death (or Conversion) do us Part – Coptic Divorces in Egyptian Courts and
Their Implications
by Barbara Viktoria Bishay
under the advising of Dr. Hanan Kholoussy

When President Gamal Abdel Nasser nationalized and unified the courts in 1956, he
aimed at fostering unity and equality among the Egyptians. But this move has in fact
achieved quite the opposite, as it forces Coptic Egyptians to sometimes choose
between the freedom of practicing their religion and equality before the law, two basic
human and civil rights that should be granted to all. By nationalizing the courts and
yet still adhering to religious codes of personal status laws (PSL), legal dualism has
not ceased to exist in Egypt and it is put into an ambivalent status between civil and
Islamic state. Through these realities, the church becomes a state within the state of
Egypt. This can be proven in the example of divorce, as two valid and at the same
time contradicting judgments can and are issued in the exact same divorce case.

This thesis combines historical studies of various kinds, such as on the court system in
Egypt, on the country‘s social and political history, on the relationship between the
Egyptian state and the Coptic Orthodox Church as well as on the historical
development of the Coptic canon laws since 1938. A historical basis and framework is
thus provided for the analysis of Coptic divorces in connection to citizenship rights in
contemporary times. As scholarship on contemporary divorce cases is extremely rare
to non-existent, newspaper articles build the main reference and primary source for
examining this issue. Continuous connections to the history of Coptic divorce laws as
well as sectarianism in Egypt have been paid special attention to here, as they are of
the utmost importance when analyzing contemporary Coptic divorce with its
citizenship aspects.

This thesis‘s findings prove the reality of legal dualism in Egypt, and that the Coptic
Church has developed and inherited state-like qualities through this dualism, as well
as through its relationship with the Egyptian state. Divorce becomes here an arena for
negotiating not just citizenship but control over the Coptic laity and their private
affairs. Both the church and the state enter this discourse with ambivalence and double
standards, where both cannot seem to decide if they want Egypt to be a civil or an
Islamic state. Citizenship for the Copts is limited by either side, when the Coptic
citizen, who is looking to divorce, is put in the middle of the power struggles between
these two forces and his two loyalties.
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1. INTRODUCTION
―When the issue is a strictly religious one, there is no space for people to express a
personal opinion.‖1

The issue that the Coptic Pope Shenouda III is discussing in this interview is Coptic
divorces in contemporary Egypt. As the personal status laws (PSL) in Egypt are based
on religion and its texts, marriage and divorce usually fall into a religious category.
Thus, in an Islamic country, such as Egypt, logically the PSL are based on Islamic
laws. But as the Copts are an indigenous part of the Egyptian community, it would
only be logical that they would have their own legal code for personal affairs, as both
religions‘ views on matters such as divorce and marriage differ significantly.
This thesis aims to deal with Coptic divorces in Egypt, a topic that has been
widely under researched despite the fact that it has had a revival wave of attention in
Egyptian public discourse in recent years. More specifically, this analysis deals with
the question of how Islamic laws in Egypt relate to the Copts, and the impact that
these laws have on the family and on citizenship rights of the Copts. In order to
comprehend the significance of the citizenship issues that the Copts face in cases of
divorce, it is important to keep in mind that citizenship in Egypt is not to be
understood in the same ways as citizenship is in the West.
Citizenship
The Western model of citizenship as allocated by the state is in its basis a
contract between the members of the national community and the state, which is
defined by rights given from the state to the citizen in return of certain obligations the

1

H. Guindy, Shukrallah & Tadros 1999.
1

citizen has towards the state, both of which might vary from country to country. 2
Thus, both entities, the state as well as the citizenry, have certain responsibilities
toward each other and citizenship can hence ―be considered the organizing principle
of state-society relations in modern states.‖3 Equality and equal rights have to be the
main themes of citizenship it seems. Peter E. Makari goes as far as to state that when
equality is not given, membership is interpreted as denied in modern societies today.4
It is important to bear in mind though that each member of a society
experiences ―multiple and overlapping types and forms of membership in different
groups on such grounds as ethnic, religious or cultural identity (…).‖5 Hence, the Copt
for example has to attempt to connect the religious affiliation with the identification of
oneself as an Egyptian. In this process two major concerns rise to the surface: To what
extent can one express his or her religious identity and be tolerated, 6 especially a
member of an indigenous religious minority? And ―what is the definition of
community in Egypt? Is it the community of Egyptians, or is it defined in terms of
religious affiliation?‖7
Suad Joseph makes the point that in Middle Eastern societies the individual
citizen is connected to the state through membership in a religious community. A
religious identity becomes here a political one, as the citizen-state relationship is
negotiated and determined through the religious community and identity. 8 ―Thus, the
individual member of the society is accorded his or her legal status by virtue of
belonging to a specific group; citizenship becomes in effect an indirect relationship
2

Butenschon 2000: 5.
Butenschon 2000: 11.
4
Makari 2007: 16.
5
Naim 2008: 158.
6
Makari 2007: 8.
7
Makari 2007: 16.
8
Joseph 2003: 11.
3

2

between the citizen and the state (…).‖9 This fact is highly significant for this research
on Coptic divorce. Copts are thus connected through the church to the state, which in
result weakens the latter and strengthens the church, putting it into the position of a
Coptic representative. In question of Coptic divorces and remarriages, as these are as
well religious issues as Pope Shenouda pointed out, one has to always bear this reality
in mind.
Citizenship here is ultimately connected to religion and the family, which are
both interconnected in Egypt as well through Egyptian family law. As there are no
civil alternatives to the religious family laws in Egypt, these codes have been critical
in creating the legal identity of citizens, as well as linking the family directly to
religious institutions and leadership.10 The problematic of having no civil alternative
to the religious family laws becomes utterly noteworthy here, as the citizen has no
chance of asking the state to intervene in the religious institution‘s decisions and the
state has no chance of it, even if it wanted. Religious institutions as well as religious
identities become logically all the more powerful through these linkages and
regulations in the PSL, as these are the only area within the state where one‘s own
religion and religious heritage are still practiced and preserved.
This brief account is extremely important for the further developments and
illustrations of this research. Only through these considerations and realities become
the conflicts and the dilemmas the Copts in Egypt are facing, and the deepness and
complicatedness of the discourse on Coptic divorce clear. In connection to the brief
illustrations from above derives the main argument of this thesis, which is that even

9

Butenschon 2000: 23.
Joseph 2003: 20.
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though the nationalization of the courts in 195611 was supposed to bring about unity
and equality among the Egyptians, it achieved the opposite, showing that Coptic
Egyptian citizens do sometimes need to choose between equality before the law and
freedom of practicing their religion. This can especially be seen in the question of
Egyptian PSL in general and divorce in particular, as Egyptian PSL are derived from
the shari‗a (Islamic law) where divorce is allowed, but generally forbidden in Coptic
law. Egypt‘s peculiar status between religion and secularism makes the church a state
within the state, as two different judgments can be derived from the two different
personal status laws, such as a divorce and even after nationalization in 1956, legal
dualism has not ceased to exist.
The choice between equality before the law versus freedom of religion or
rather a civil state code law versus Islamic law is one of the main themes of my thesis.
Such a problematic that some members of a nation should have to choose between two
basic rights as well as the problematic of double standards in the rule of law are both
not compatible with the civil state. Every citizen of a civil state should have the same
fundamental rights and should be equal before the law. Thus, this conflict then can be
used as a way to reveal basic features of Coptic divorce, as it puts the Copts in the
position of having to choose one right over the other.
This conflict is, in my opinion, also one of the reasons that triggered the
national debate on Coptic divorce in the media. Just in recent years there have been a
couple of cases, such as a group of 45 Copts that converted to Islam to obtain a

11

Law No 462 was issued under President Nasser in 1956, which abolished the
religious PSL courts and brought them under the national courts. This is one of the
key years and events in this thesis, as this law included the further centralization of the
Egyptian state but did not abolish dual legalism as it incorporated the stipulation that
each litigant and each case would still be judged through its own religious canon
personal status laws.
4

divorce and then wanted to convert back to Christianity in 2007. While at first the
court‘s decision opted against it, in the end the Christians won their case and the
religion in their identification papers was officially changed again. Pope Shenouda,
however, did reject openly to issue them permissions to re-marry. This rejection then
triggered many responses from intellectuals, Muslims as well as Copts, and state
officials as the Supreme Administrative Court ordered the church to issue such
permission. This case is going to be used as one of the main examples in this thesis to
illustrate the agendas, motivations and double standards of the church as well as the
Egyptian state in this debate. Both represent themselves as protectors or demanders
for equal citizenship rights for Copts, but in the end, citizenship is limited by each.
Challenges and Acknowledgments
It becomes quite obvious how complicated and controversial the issue of
Coptic divorce is. As with any topic, a scholar should try to research a topic as
unbiased as possible, however, it is clear that biases, opinions and tendencies are
developed throughout the research process. I have tried my utmost to write this thesis
as neutrally as possible. As a Copt and a European, I tried to remain aware of my own
biases. Yet I do believe my oscillation between siding with the Egyptian state on one
point and with the Coptic Church on another is a reflection of bias or deference, but
rather conveys just how complicated the issue at hand is.
This thesis is just the first step towards a comprehensive study on Coptic
divorce. Further research needs to be done in various questions and problems that
come with it, such as the multilayered nature of the discourse as well as the struggles.
This thesis focuses mostly on the political debates and the struggle between the
government and the Coptic Church. The inner-laity and inner-church struggles are

5

touched upon, but surely need to be developed much further, as well as the religious
and legal layers of the debates. The politicization of religion, of both Islam and Coptic
Christianity, that has happened in Egypt since the presidency of Anwar Al-Sadat is
mentioned in this thesis as well, especially in its expressions through sectarian
violence. While this point needs to could be developed further, it is beyond the scope
of my research.
It is naturally quite clear that neither the Egyptian state nor the Coptic Church
are homogenous entities. This thesis‘ aim is neither to homogenize these entities nor
to imply that all of the Coptic clergy or all of the state administration act to gain
power and influence over the Coptic laity or over the respective other as well.
Certainly, there are clergymen that act purely out of the conviction of doing what is
best for the laity. The debate, at least for the Coptic Church, is clearly about a
religious issue. However, this thesis aims to demonstrate that it has political
undertones as well, which should not be underestimated. However, even though
throughout the thesis, I refer to these individuals as ‗the state‘ and ‗the church‘, I am
aware that these institutions are not homogenous and there are struggles, discourses
and conflicts within.
Research Questions
In my thesis I am going to analyze the nature of the national debate on Coptic
divorce: Is it political, legal or religious? I aim to illustrate that the question of Coptic
divorce combines these three aspects and therefore has to be examined through all its
different characteristics. The political aspect, for example, is hidden in the Copts‘
choice between freedom of religion and equality before the law—two fundamental
rights of citizenship—as well as the power struggles between the church and the state.

6

The question of state intervention becomes evident here, but how much would
religious freedom be confined then? It is also a legal debate of course, as it raises the
question of which laws should govern whom, or can there be a unified code of laws,
which respects and tolerates every citizen‘s class, gender, beliefs, etc.? The problem
then becomes religious as well since personal status law is a religious-based law. The
PSL in Egypt, which are based on Islamic law, should have no basis for ruling over
the Copts but it would grant them more rights to divorce than their own laws.
My thesis also identifies the actors and structures in the debate over Coptic
divorce. I focus on three main actors: the church, the state, and the Coptic laity. What
prompts the individual actors and structures? What are their positions, intentions and
goals? It is evident that each side of the Coptic divorce issue has to be seen, examined
and understood in its different contexts. The Egyptian state for example faces the
dilemma of, on the one hand, being progressive and promoting justice and equality
among its citizens and, on the other hand, proclaiming itself as being Islamic and
honouring its religious traditions and customs.
The Coptic Church, on the other hand, first and foremost aims to ‗protect‘ its
community, whose basis is the family, while also calling for equal national rights for
the Coptic citizens of Egypt. Sectarian tensions and violence become especially
important here and always need to be remembered and mentioned when analyzing the
church‘s position and the developments of Coptic divorce laws. But wouldn‘t full
equal rights mean as well that the Coptic citizens could divorce just like the Muslim
citizens can? This position is perhaps surprisingly widely held. Coptic as well as
Muslim journalists point out the double standards in this debate, which lead back to
the main issue, freedom of practising religion versus equality before the law.

7

Chapter Outline
The positions of the church, the state and the laity on Coptic divorces and
Coptic PSL do have to be understood in their contexts. Therefore, history plays an
important part in comprehending the debate, especially the sectarian tensions that
have risen since the 1980s as well as the history of the Copts in Egypt. In Chapter
Two, ―Divorcing in Christianity, Islam and the Egyptian State,‖ I analyze the history
of the Coptic divorce laws, the specific legal articles and their changes and
developments in connection to the political and social history of Egypt, naturally with
a specific focus on the Copts in Egypt and the relationship between the state and the
church. This chapter demonstrates how Coptic divorce laws developed alongside
many significant factors, such as the political climate in Egypt, sectarian tensions, the
relationship between the president and the pope as well as the influence of Islamic
laws and their changes. Such comparisons will confirm how these PSL and these
conflicts about them are as much about religion as they are a reaction to the wider
environment, climate and atmosphere of Egypt.
The third chapter, ―Divorcing Copts Today: The Public Discourse,‖ is an
illustration and analysis of the media discourse on Coptic divorce, with the main
example of the case of 2007/2008 and the question of re-conversion and remarriage.
This chapter‘s main aim is to demonstrate the double standards of both the church and
the state in this debate, proving that divorce becomes here an arena for negotiating
citizenship and control over the Coptic laity. While it should not be denied that the
religious undertones and levels are important and significant, especially to the Coptic
Church as the PSL in Egypt are supposed to be based on religion and thus not a state
matter, one cannot refute that the political undertones in this debate are equally strong.
The public discourse already hints at the other choice the Copts are facing in this
8

discourse. Not only are they forced to decide between two basic laws, they also must
choose between their state and their church.
―The Church versus The State,‖ the fourth chapter of the thesis, deals more
specifically with this conflict and choice of the Copts. As both the church and the state
claim to be the Copts‘ representative, when it comes to the question of divorce and
remarriage, the Coptic citizen will ultimately have to choose between one of them.
This is significant in that the Coptic Church has actually the right to ask for that kind
of power and influence over Coptic family affairs, because firstly, the PSL are
religious in Egypt and thus leave the church as the authority and secondly because the
state is recognizing the church as the Coptic civil and political representative out of
the concept of Middle Eastern citizenship. This chapter thus illustrates that the church
has become a state within the Egyptian state in regards to family matters as two
contradicting judgments can and often will be issued in the exact same divorce case.
The question of remarriage is central here and becomes once more a testimony of the
discourse‘s undertones, which are control and power struggles between the two
entities and which put the Coptic citizen right in the middle.
Review of the Literature
The public discourse on Coptic divorce is multi-levelled and truly
complicated. One has to keep in mind the social and political environment to
understand the true implications and reasons, which are underlying of the actors‘
actions, agendas and attitudes. Without keeping those in mind, one fails to truly grasp
the complexity and different undertones of this issue. Therefore, a variety of sources
are needed to completely comprehend and convey all the underlying nuances and
implications.

9

As I have mentioned above, the topic of Coptic divorce, especially in
contemporary times, is highly under researched. Most of the scholarship deals either
with the history of the Copts in Egypt in all its variety, be it sectarianism, the history
of the church‘s formation or the Copts‘ role in politics. Rarely are there sources that
deal with Copts divorcing in Egypt, but the few that do mostly describe Copts using
the Islamic courts during the Ottoman Empire.12 I have used the existent scholarship
in order to build a historical framework to my arguments as well as provide proof that
before the nationalization of the courts, Copts did not face the choices and difficulties
they face today. Thus, one of the key years of my thesis is 1956, the year of
nationalization. Another is 1938, the year in which a Coptic canon law on divorce was
drafted by the Coptic community council and which is still used today by the courts,
even though the church does not recognize it. I have focused furthermore on the
1970s, where sectarian tensions have run especially high and in which the conflicts
between the state and the church escalated. But as my thesis is a contemporary work,
the main focus lies on recent years, such as 2006 and 2008, in which the Supreme
Administrative Court issued ambivalent decrees in relation to Coptic divorces.
Contemporary works are difficult, and in English I would say impossible to
find. Arabic sources are more widely available but contemporary works on Coptic
divorce are also lacking. Mostly they are, as their English-language counterparts,
theoretical works on the power structures or politics of law. I think this is probably
because of the high controversy of this topic as well as the ‗public sensitivity‘ among
many Copts that church matters should stay inside the church. Only very few authors
have taken on the task of writing about Copts divorcing today. The most prominent

See for example the works of Najwa al-Qattan (1999), Muhammad Afifi (1999) or
Ron Shaham (2006).
12
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study is by Coptic journalist and activist Karimah Kamal (2006). Her study provides
an historical background but focuses on the present issues. Her sources consist
primarily of her numerous interviews with intellectuals, such as Professor Muhammad
Nur Farhat and Dr. Samir Tanaghu, and examples of divorce cases filed by Copts in
the past and present. She has also included letters to her from readers, both prodivorce and anti-divorce voices from the Coptic laity. My project departs drastically
from hers, as she neither focuses on citizenship nor on the public debates in the press.
It becomes obvious in her research that she is not in the pro-church camp in this
conflict, as she is not attempting to scrutinize the church‘s position sufficiently.
I have used a variety of diverse historical studies. Some sources deal with the
history of the Copts in Egypt, which does play a (granted) minor part in the thesis.
However, I incorporated these studies, such as Pennington (1982), McCallum (2007)
and Tadros (2009), since I believe it is important to know the history of the Copts in
Egypt and the history of the church-state relationship in order to understand the
different positions in the contemporary conflict, especially the church‘s and its devote
followers. My second chapter describes the history of Copts in Egypt alongside the
history of the divorce laws, in order to illustrate their connection. In this respect, these
historical studies become extremely important to analyze and understand the church‘s
attitude in this issue.
Many works in related scholarship that I have used are theoretical or historical
works on the Egyptian court system or Islamic law in Egypt. In these works, one can
sometimes find a few pages or a chapter about non-Muslims who use these courts. I
have utilized studies like Sulayman‘s (2006), Brown‘s (1997), Afifi‘s (1996), alQattan‘s (1999) and Shaham‘s (2006) to provide the historical background of my
project. But mostly the scholarship describes Coptic divorce from a legal and
11

historical perspective, such as the history of Egypt‘s courts, the historical development
of Coptic divorce laws and how Egypt‘s Copts figured into Egypt‘s legal history.
Thus, one can build a theoretical framework in regards to the Egyptian court system
and its history, Egypt‘s legal and political history as well as Islamic law and its
developments. Actual research for contemporary cases on non-Muslims using these
laws though is very rare. Other sources, such as Afifi (1996) or Shaham (2006),
explain how Copts used the Islamic courts, which will be important to show that
before the nationalization in 1956, the non-Muslim citizens did have a choice of
which court to adhere.
The problem with these studies is that they do not connect their research to
contemporary times. Therefore I think my thesis can make a niche for itself by
connecting the past with the present. Furthermore, my thesis links Coptic divorce
directly to Coptic citizenship, something that has not been done in the related
scholarship. My project departs thus from previous research, as its aim is to analyze
Coptic divorce and its discourse in contemporary times in connection with the choice
between two basic laws that every Copt, who strives to divorce, faces. As it has been
illustrated, scholarship on this topic is scarce, therefore I use newspaper articles to
provide a basis for my arguments and for my analysis on the public discourse.
Sources and Methodologies
One of this thesis‘ main sources include newspaper articles from Al-Ahram
Weekly, Al-Masry Al-Youm, Daily News and Egypt Today. These articles are my main
primary sources as they are one of the only ways to gain insight into the contemporary
state of the Coptic divorce issue. They also voice the opinion of the state officials,
public, and clergy alike. As these articles build the basis for my arguments on

12

contemporary times, I have focused solely on these years, starting with the year 1999
until 2010, especially concentrating here on 2006, 2007 and 2008. I have decided to
include governmental (Al-Ahram Weekly) as well as independent newspapers (Daily
News Egypt, Al-Masry al-Youm, Egypt Today) in order to obtain and banalnce a
variety of viewpoints.
All of the articles I have drawn upon can be found in the Internet archives of
each newspaper‘s website. I have used only the English sections of these archives, as I
needed to narrow my research further. Because the public debate has been revived in
recent years, numerous articles on this topic are available. All of the newspapers I
have used are major ones in Egypt and have huge, accessible websites and archives.
While searching for and reading these articles, I put my focus on the question of
citizenship in connection to divorce, concentrating more on the Coptic voices, as this
thesis is about Coptic divorce, but I have included government officials‘ statements as
well, scrutinizing each attitude and testimony.
Other key factors that I kept in mind as I did my research were the double
standards of the church, as well as the state. I chose the articles that best conveyed the
complete picture of Coptic divorce, with all its different nuances and facets, while I
continued to ask major questions: How and where do these individuals or institutions
perceive the connection between Coptic divorce and Coptic citizenship? Is there such
a thing as a mainstream attitude among the laity? On which nuances of Coptic divorce
is concentrated the most – the political, religious or legal nature? What are the
undertones in this debate – is it truly about divorce or is it more of a power struggle
between the different actors? The third chapter of this thesis is the result of this
research, an analysis of the public discourse on Coptic divorce, in which special
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attention is paid to main factors and nuances of this issue, such as its political nature
in connection to citizenship and the double standards that creep into the debate.
Three main voices in this public discourse are those of Gamal Nkrumah,
Sameh Fawzy and Milad Hanna. The latter two are Coptic intellectuals that are often
quoted in newspapers, while Fawzy has written numerous articles on Coptic divorce
as well as Coptic citizenship. Through their writings, it becomes fairly obvious that all
three of them are secularists, or at least of the opinion that the church should not be
given the political power it now holds. Nkrumah, whose mother is an Egyptian Copt
and father was the first president of Ghana, has written extensively on the issue of
Coptic divorces. While he mostly cites in his articles for Al-Ahram Weekly, it is whom
he cites, such as Hanna, Fawzy or Mageed Tobia, another Coptic activist that makes
his own attitude as a secularist quite obvious. However, I have contextualized the
voices quoted in these articles, rather than the authors themselves.
I have put the argument of the secularists alongside the clergy‘s, the
government‘s and the public‘s, in order to present a balanced picture of all the
different undertones and nuances of the debate on Coptic divorces, as each group
would focus on different aspects or would have a different stance towards a specific
issue, such as citizenship or the church‘s attitude for example. It is in this way, that I
divided the articles up, rather than group them together. I focused mainly on the
persons quoted, rather than the author‘s comments, except in a few cases, such as with
Sameh Fawzy who is a prominent Coptic thinker himself, and thus a member of the
laity in the public discourse. I have partly included the Muslim public though through
Karimah Kamal‘s study on Coptic divorce. Through her various interviews, with both
Coptic as well as Muslim professors of law and lawyers, the Muslim public is given a
voice as well in this analysis. I do limit myself to the Muslim intellectuals Kamal has
14

interviewed, as it would have broken the scope of this research if I had included
Muslim public opinion. I also believe that in these power struggles between church,
state and laity, the Muslim public does not play a significant role, and thus I have
decided not to include that voice in a bigger extent.
In order to present my arguments and provide substantial proof and a
framework for them, the above-described method of arranging the public discourse
has been much more helpful and efficient, in that it focuses solely on the three main
actors – the church, the state and the laity. Contextualizing the articles according to
their authors‘ religion, political attitude, etc. and not by the individuals and institutions
that are being quoted, better elucidates my analysis of the public discourse. The
discourse on Coptic divorce has a religious, political and legal nature and each
struggle is equal in importance and intensity to the others.
By combining the variety of historical studies with the contemporary
newspaper articles, many facets and nuances of the discourse on Coptic divorce have
become apparent in this exploration. One has been mentioned above, the reality that
this discourse has in fact three natures and cannot be understood without either one of
them. Another conclusion drawn in course of this research is that the power struggles
between the church, which has become a state-like entity within the Egyptian state
and the Egyptian state itself, are not as much about divorces as they are about control
– control over the Coptic laity, their private affairs and the Coptic PSL. Divorce
becomes in fact, the arena of negotiating Coptic citizenship, which is limited by either
force, the state as well as the church, even though both claim to demand and defend
full citizenship rights for the Coptic citizen, who is put in the middle and has to
choose not only between his own agendas, wishes and desires but between his church
and his state.
15

2. DIVORCING IN CHRISTIANITY, ISLAM AND THE EGYPTIAN STATE
Both Islam and the Coptic Church have different histories of dealing with
divorce as well as completely different understandings of the concept of marriage.
While in Islam it is handled as a contractual matter and thus can be dissolved if
necessary or if one of the two parties does not honor this contract, in the Coptic
Church it is a sacrament, not to be broken by anything except adultery.13 As these two
religions, with their own understandings and customs, have lived and developed next
to each other for centuries in Egypt, it is quite natural that a meshing of their customs
and traditions, such as marriage and divorce for example, has taken place over time. It
is also natural and in connection to the mixing of these traditions, that as society
develops and changes in certain directions, these customs and, in Egypt‘s case, laws
would have to change with these developments, be these changes rooted in
liberalization or in fundamentalism.
I aim to demonstrate in this chapter how religious divorce laws in Egypt have
changed and developed from 1938, which was the year the Majlis al-Milli (The Coptic
Community Council) issued a decree on Coptic family law, which was then applied
by the state14 until today in relation to the history of the Copts in Egypt. I will briefly
touch on Islamic divorce laws in order to show the similarities (and differences)
between these two legislative systems. In order to put these laws and developments
then into a practical perspective, I will further give a description on the views of the
Egyptian state on the matter of Coptic divorces and divorce laws and how legislation
in general is to be handled in its point of view. When the developments of Coptic
divorce laws are told alongside the history of the Copts in Egypt, it becomes clear that
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these laws did develop according and in connection and influence to the social and
political history of Egypt.
My main argument of this thesis is that the nationalization of the courts in
1956 forced Coptic citizens to choose between equality before the law and practicing
their religion freely, two major citizenship rights that should not be mutually exclusive
and that should be granted to every Egyptian citizen. The nationalization of the courts
further muddled Egypt‘s ambiguous status between a secular state and a religious
state, as legal dualism has not ceased to exist and the church has become a state within
a state, in regards to personal status laws (PSL). While before 1956, Egypt had a dual
court system, in which PSL cases were handled in different courts according to one‘s
religion, as we shall see, the nationalization of 1956 thus has centralized the court
system and brought it a lot further under the state‘s control. However, it has neither
centralized nor unified the legal system of Egypt, as the PSL cases are still handled
through various legislations, according to the litigants‘ religion.
This main point can be proven through the review and comparison I provide in
this chapter. Divorce laws changed according to history, whereas the sources – the
new testament, decisions of the Holy Synod, sayings of the apostles and books of the
fuqaha (the religious scholars) have not, and throughout this history the Coptic Church
has called for equal citizenship rights.15 But through this chapter, it will become
apparent that the church is contradicting itself, when it comes to divorce and marriage
laws and citizenship rights. Either the state will grant the church control over these
laws, as it has done in the past, or it will seize it, which has partly happened in various
incidents in recent years, such as in 2006 or 2008 when the Supreme Administrative
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Court ordered the Coptic Church to remarry divorcees even though it did not
recognize their divorce.
In either case, divorce here becomes an arena where citizenship is not only
negotiated but where Copts are actually made second-class citizens, if not by the state
then by their own church in the name of protection of the community and the religious
values. The developments of the Coptic divorce laws are part and parcel of the
modern history of the Copts in Egypt. The struggles of the different legal reforms and
citizenship issues as well as the tensions and struggles between church and state and
Copts and Muslims all have undoubtedly influenced the development of Coptic
divorce and its laws and regulations.

2.1 The semi-colonial period
My overview of the Copts in Egypt begins with the year 1919 because the
1919 revolution represented a significant turning point in Egypt‘s national history as
the anticolonial struggle for independence from the British, followed by a constitution
in 1923 opened up the discourse on citizenship.16 In addition, most Egyptian secular
thinkers also consider the 1919 revolution as the highpoint of political and national
integration amongst all Egyptians, regardless of religion.17
After World War I, the Wafd18 political party established a political climate
that was liberal and secular, where the Copts played an important role in Egypt‘s fight
for independence. The Wafd, under Saad Zaghloul, unified Coptic and Muslim
Egyptians in the struggle against British occupation with slogans, such as
16
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‗Nationalism is our religion‘, that stressed the unity and equality among the citizens.19
This political unity largely lasted throughout the remainder of Egypt‘s period of quasiindependence (1923-1956). In this politically secular environment, the Coptic Majlis
al-Milli (something akin of a Community Council) issued in 1938 a decree 20 of Coptic
PSL naming nine reasons for divorce, even though the Holy Bible states that divorce
was only permissible in the case of adultery (i.e.: MT 5,32 or LK 16,18).21 Articles
50-58 of the 1938 decree stated that divorce is permissible in the following cases:
Adultery, conversion to another religion, absence for a period of five
consecutive years with no news of whereabouts, being judged and
sentenced to seven years imprisonment, mental illness, a contagious
illness, or impotence with no recovery for at least three years, serious
domestic violence, debauchery or immoral behavior, separation for at least
three years as a result of untenable marital life, joining a monastic order.22

The potential for divorce was thus widened considerably and, as one can see,
in tune with modern society and relationships in a liberal, secular climate. Such a
political climate influences the institutions‘ views and attitudes towards relationships
and family life as we can see. Thus divorce was granted more easily when the Coptic
community was not understood to be in danger. The preceeding articles 45,46 and 47
describe then the rights and obligations of husband and wife. Article 45 obliges the
husband to protect his wife while the following two articles compel the wife to be
obedient to her husband (46) as well as to live with him and follow him to whichever
place he might go, taking care of the money, the children and to supervise the
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household (47).23 It is interesting to note how ―relatively modern― the stipulations of
divorce were, but marriage life was still organized in patriarchal terms and these
duties and rights, were much the same as in Islamic Law. These laws, that were
developed in a time of cooperation between Muslims and Copts, are proof of such a
relationhip, where interaction and influences had surely taken place.
Marriage in Islam is serving the community by regulating relationships and
assigning rights as well as responsibilities, to the husband / father and the wife /
mother. Such responsibilities and rights include the concept of nafaqa (maintenance)
and nushuz (disobedience). The husband‘s responsibility to maintain his wife and
provide her with food, housing and clothing due to her class‘s standard of living were
met by his wife‘s responsibility to be obedient to him.24 The similarities to Coptic
laws on family and the rights and responsibilities of wife and husband become quite
obvious. Both are decreed to be ‗protecting the wife‘, here in Islam meaning
maintaining and providing for her and her obedience towards the husband.
Even though the Majlis al-Milli had no legislation authority, as the Holy
Synod and of course the pope did, the decree was recognized as derived from
customs, which is a principal source of lawmaking.25 The 1938 decree continued
therefore to be understood as a basis for Coptic canon law in personal status matters
and was thus applied in Coptic personal affairs after Law 462 in 1956, by which
Nasser nationalized and unified the courts and brought all PSL cases under the
National Courts. Before 1956, each religious denomination had its own court and
these religious courts were handling PSL cases. This weakened the state while giving
the religious institution a lot more influence and power over the laity‘s private affairs,
23
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as we shall see in the following chapter. Article 6 of Law 462 stipulated that the canon
laws of each religious denomination were to be applied in PSL matters, only if both
litigants of a case were of the same sect and rite. If this necessary stipulation were not
fulfilled, Islamic law would be applied to the case.26
Since the late nineteenth century, the jurisdiction of the Islamic courts has
been largely confined to personal status matters. Islamic PSL were not strictly
regulated nor state sponsored until their nationwide codification in 1920. While
reforms of the Hanafi Islamic laws were opposed by certain segments of the public,
Egyptian legislators started to draw from the Maliki and Shafi‘i schools of law in their
‗nationalization‘ of the Islamic PSL.27 The 1920 nationwide codification of Egyptian
Islamic PSL (and its 1929 amendment) largely influenced and inspired the 1938
Coptic personal status legislation. They widened the scope for female initiated
divorces and at the same time limited the husband‘s right to unilateral divorce, which
is called talaq. In this form of divorce, the husband does not need a reason for divorce,
he does need to go to court, his wife cannot protest or fight it and his financial
obligations towards her are temporary and limited.28
In 1920, Law 25 was introduced, through which wives could obtain judicial
divorces for various reasons, for example, in case the husband did not provide
financially, if the husband was absent or imprisoned and could thus not provide for
her or if the husband had a physical or mental illness without any hope for a cure. 29 In
the face of the struggle for independence from the British Empire, the Egyptian
administration put a strong emphasis upon the physical as well as financial health of
26
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marriage which was viewed as the cornerstone of the burgeoning Egyptian nation.30
Thus in 1920, attempts were made to secure marriage much further, which resulted in
granting the wives very limited grounds for judicial divorce, such as the husband‘s
inability to financially support her or the an incurable illness, which had to be
unknown to the wife before the wedding. 31
Law 25 of 1929 recognized the wife‘s right for divorce in case of
maltreatment, which had not been established in the 1920 reforms. 32 Furthermore, the
1929 law is significant in that it regulated and restricted the men‘s right to unilateral
divorce. It constricted this right of the husband through a number of reasons and
circumstances, in which the divorce would not be recognized. These stipulations
included for example, if the divorce formula was uttered under intoxication (Art.1), as
a threat to the wife (Art.2) or if the divorce oath was uttered three times at once
(Art.3).33
As the Islamic shari‘a provided men with this right of unilateral divorce,
Egyptians in this time called upon the government to restrict these stipulations. This
has to be seen in the background of the struggle for independence and thus, the
Egyptian family needed to be protected from Egyptian men haphazardly destroying it.
It is interesting to note that the same tightening and restricting of divorce laws later
happened for the Copts under Pope Shenouda in the 1970s. Both Coptic and Islamic
codes of law thus underwent similar changes for similar reasons in the twentieth
century, as the protection of the family against an outer enemy can certainly be
understood as a basis for reforming these laws on both sides. While for Copts the
30
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sectarian violence and tensions represented this threat from the 1970s onwards, for the
Egyptian Muslims it was the British in colonial times that endangered the Egyptian
family. In both instances, the family was understood as the basis of the community
and thus for the sake of the community‘s survival had to be preserved, nourished and
protected at any cost, even if these families were unhappy.

2.2 The Copts under Nasser
While after full independence under Gamal Abdel Nasser‘s era (1955-1970),
the Copts‘ political role became largely marginalized, this period had positive
outcomes for the Copts as well. The secular climate was continued and there were
little conflict between the state and the church, which was mostly because the pope,
Anba Kyrillos, understood himself as a spiritual and not political leader. 34 One could
wonder if the pope‘s self-portrayal was in turn connected to Nasser‘s rather secular
politics. For instance, the 1956 constitution established a ―legal belief in the horizontal
comradeship between Muslims and Copts and men and women.‖35 Article 3, which
granted equality before the law, regardless of sex, religion or race, and Article 43,
which granted absolute freedom of belief, are two examples of nurturing equality
between Muslims and Copts. But even in such a secular climate, religion did creep
into the constitution at some points. Article 5 declared the family as the basis of
society, which was to be shaped by religion, ethics, morality and patriotism and
Article 3 named Islam the religion of state.36
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Christian laws as well began to be only somewhat protected as switching one‘s
sect or rite, or even one‘s religion became a favored strategy for litigants to obtain
different judgments. The switching of faiths or denominations became a serious and
highly problematic loophole of Law 462 of 1956, which stipulates that Islamic law
should be applied if litigants are not of the same sect or rite, as we have seen. Even
though this section of the law is interpreted as meaning that the switching of sect or
rite has had to happen before the actual dispute in court occurred, and Islamic law was
then only to be applied, as well as when one of the litigants converted to Islam (here it
does not matter when the conversion occurs)37, but this interpretation was not always
followed in the past. It is doubtful that the application of Islamic law is not really
justifiable when both litigants are Christians and have existent laws. Clearly, the
state‘s aim was to apply another code of law when two competing Christian codes
clashed and thus to mediate between the two. Yet it is understandable that the Coptic
Church views this as a serious problem.
These developments among the Coptic laity, as it was finding ways to resist
and oppose possible judgments of their own church, must be seen in their specific
historical context. The 1950s were, as I have mentioned, coined by a relative
unproblematic relationship between church and state as well as Muslims and
Christians. Thus, Copts opposing the church‘s judgments and dogmas could hardly be
accused as traitors and splitting the Coptic community, as it is done today, because of
the relative harmony amongst the Egyptians. Through the secular climate, the Coptic
identity and community was not perceived to be under threat or in danger. The church
could not build on this argument in the past, as it can now.
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A few decades later a split was created in the Coptic laity in 1971, which has
not ceased to exist until today: the laymen that defend the church‘s views as being
sacred versus the laypeople who were going against these views in search and pursue
of their own benefits. This split was not to be mended but only widened further as
time went on and the political and social climate in Egypt changed under a new
president, as well as under a new pope of the Coptic Church.

2.3 The Copts under Sadat
Both Nasser and Pope Kyrillos died in the beginning of the 1970s, which led
to changes in the relationship between the state and the Coptic Church. The pope‘s
successor, Shenouda III, was both praised and criticized for his uncompromising
nature, which critics connected with his authoritarianism.38 Similarly, Nasser‘s
successor Anwar al-Sadat (r. 1970-1981) emphasized Islamic piety strongly in his
politics.39 The new president had various reasons for supporting the already
developing Islamic trend that was occurring in Egypt since its humiliating defeat to
Israel in the 1967 war and the deteriorating economic situation. Through supporting
the Islamists, President Sadat‘s aim was to weaken the Nasserites and to gain political
support of the Islamist student organizations, which he in return strongly supported.
Both the pope‘s authoritarianism and the president‘s mobilization of Islam helped
create a lot of conflicts between the two forces.
The 1970s were the starting point for a strong and continuous wave of
discriminations against the Copts in the public sector, such as political and educational
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disadvantages. The Copts related everything to their religion, which gave them a
minority status,40 making them increasingly aware of legal discriminations because of
the implementation of certain Islamic rules,41 which added to the tensions between the
two communities. The 1971 constitution for example would in Sadat‘s words ―express
the true Egyptian way of life and tradition.‖42 Article 2 stated that Islam would be the
religion of the state,43 which in itself was not new but just maintained from the 1956
constitution. But it was added that the shari‘a would be a principal source of
legislation.44 Thus, one has to always keep in mind that the ―confessional troubles of
the past ten years or so have been played against the background of this perception of
discrimination.‖ 45
Even though in 1977 Sadat ―stressed the importance of ‗national unity‘ (the
government‘s shorthand phrase for peace between Copts and Muslims)‖46 sectarian
incidents happened throughout this year in provinces, such as Minya and Assiut
between Coptic and Muslim students as well as villagers, 47 thus occurring among all
classes and segments of society. Copts accused Sadat‘s government of not caring
about these events, as sectarianism worsened in the 1980s, when for example the
Muslim fundamentalist group Hizb al Jihad tried to leave bombs in two churches in
Alexandria.48 Rather than attempt to settle these problems, however, the government
passed Article 2 of the current constitution in 1980, which states that the Islamic
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shari‘a would from now on be the main source of legislation.49 It is not hard to
imagine that the Copts‘ fears of Egypt becoming an Islamic state with them being
degraded to second-class citizens intensified.
After further sectarian violence in the 1980s, Sadat criticized both Muslim
fundamentalist groups as well as the Coptic pope. He accused the pope of wanting to
become a political leader and building a state within the state, which would not do the
Coptic citizenry any good. Sadat went as far as to state: ―No one has harmed the cause
of my Coptic citizens like this man.‖50 Further clashes, which happened in 1981 in
Zawyat al-Hamra, caused the president to banish the pope from Alexandria and his
position as the Coptic patriarch to a convent in Wadi Natrun, from where he would
not return until 1985 under Sadat‘s successor Hosni Mubarak.51
It would be plausible to assume that once again the ‗cause‘ that president Sadat
was talking about was probably the status of full citizens, with every right, freedom
and responsibility that comes with it. That the pope was the person who hindered
these attempts was a statement that the Copts utterly resented.52 A logical
consequence to such an announcement, which was understood as unjust and false, was
the strengthening of the clergy‘s position in the Copts‘ lives again. 53 The threat of
Islamism urged the Coptic community to support the church and its clergy, as it was
standing up against this force as well as the government, which was not successful in
providing protection. The church in turn was reinforced by these political changes and
became more conservative over time because the amendments of the constitution
intensified the fears and worries of the Copts who then turned to their church that
49
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could provide protection. These amendments not only strengthened the church and its
conservatism, but they politicized religion and religious institutions in a way that
strengthened the church‘s opposition to the government‘s actions, simply by the
support of its laity.54
Under President Sadat and Pope Shenouda, tensions began to rise not only
between the church and the state, but between Muslims and Copts as well. It was then
that the Coptic Church started to adopt a more rigorous and stricter attitude towards
marriage and divorce. In the past, Copts were not obliged to get married in the church.
As the wedding prayer in the prayer book of the priest (daftar salwat al-khidamat)
states two sentences the priest has to say, depending on the place of the wedding.
Either in the church, where he refers to them to have come together ‗at this blessed
hour in front of the holy altar‘ or when the wedding is at home, where he exchanges
the ‗in front of the holy altar‘ with ‗in front of this orthodox assembly‘. But then the
church issued a stipulation, which made the wedding in the church mandatory to be
considered valid.55 This demonstrates that the church does not want to relinquish any
control it has on the family matters of its laity.
Shenouda‘s papal decrees no. 7 and 8 of 1971 were concerned further with the
private lives of the Copts, stating that divorce was from now on only to be granted in
case of adultery (7) and a re-marriage was only to be permitted through the issuing of
a license to the innocent party of the two litigants (8). If a divorce were to be carried
out because of any other reason, the church would not recognize it and thus not grant
re-marriage licenses, and any relation that any of the litigants would have after this
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divorce would be considered adultery.56 This decree is based entirely on the views on
divorce in the Holy Bible, which states, ―Wherefore they are no more twain, but one
flesh. What therefore God hath joined together, let not man put asunder.‖ (MT19;6) as
well as Jesus‘ teaching ―But I say unto you, That whoever shall put away his wife,
saving for the cause of fornication, causeth her to commit adultery: and whosoever
shall marry her that is divorced committeth adultery.‖ (MT5;32)
Shenouda certainly intended to return to the ‗true‘ and fundamental sources of
lawmaking in Christianity, which is first and foremost the text of the Bible. He
dismissed the other eight reasons that were put down by the Majlis al-Milli for
granting a divorce as neither having a legal nor religious basis, as laymen put these
down without any authority in these two domains.57 I suppose another aim of
Shenouda‘s was strengthening the Coptic family, the basis of Coptic society, as
Sadat‘s policies posed an ever-growing threat towards it and him. Especially the
question of the remarriage license seems to be a tool here to keep control of Coptic
society and family, which had to be protected from the force of Islamism and a state
that was propagating it.
As mentioned previously, it is worthy of note that Coptic and Islamic divorce
laws underwent similar reforms and changes in the twentieth century. The reforms of
both were aimed to restrict divorce and ensure marriage as a more permanent bind
between the spouses. While they have been drafted in different time periods, I think
these laws have influenced each other, as these connections are significant since they
stem from the same basis. In a mix of feeling threatened and endangered as a
community, both institutions, the church as well as the state, have reacted in similar

56
57

Kamal 2006: 57.
Kamal 2006: 19.
29

ways. Both have restricted divorce and ensured that marriages and families, and thus
the community, are, at least legally, protected not only from the outer dangers but
from threats within as well. Divorce or loose, easy divorce laws can be understood as
one of these hazards that the community faces from within.
Needless to say, the decrees issued in the 1970s by Pope Shenouda did
probably as much damage to the unity of Coptic society as they aimed to protect it.
Through these decrees, all of the divorces that were issued prior to it out of other
reasons than adultery were as a consequence not valid anymore. This truly is a major
problem of changing the laws in such a manner and until now this has not been
sufficiently dealt with. One has to question here, whether the church considers all the
couples that had divorced and probably remarried in the span of these years adulterers.
If so, the split in the laity, which naturally occurred after these decrees, would deepen
further and would become more severe.
The Coptic laity was (and still is) mostly divided on the question of divorce
and remarriage. Karimah Kamal gives this division a lot of emphasis in her book,
citing a case where truly desperate measures were taken by a woman who had gone as
far as accusing herself falsely of committing adultery, just to get out of her marriage.58
I think this reaction, how crass it might be, can be described as a natural consequence.
After all, it is only logical that members of the laity who suffer in their marriages and
marital homes would oppose the church‘s strict rulings but those who did not have
these troubles and burdens to carry would stand behind these decisions, as these were
based on the Holy Bible and therefore considered sacred.
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It is interesting to note here that even the Coptic clergy was divided on those
ideas.59 In practice that is to say, the priests stretched the decree in its meanings and
definitions of adultery. Karimah Kamal tells the story of an outrageous case, where a
Copt was married to a paralyzed woman and in fear of committing adultery, asked the
bishop to marry him to another woman, to which the bishop as well as his first wife
agreed. The bishop supported his decision with declaring this man‘s paralyzed wife as
‗dead‘ and therefore he could marry him to another woman.60 It is needless to say, that
this Coptic man was in fact living a polygamous marriage with the blessing of the
church, something that goes against the essential Christian belief of monogamy and
that is protected by Muslim judges of the Egyptian state, as well as we shall see.
A divided clergy is logically as much a threat to Coptic unity and the basis of
Coptic society, the family, as lax divorce laws and the loopholes that Law 462 of 1956
had offered. To close these doors off to the laity, representatives of all Christian
denominations of Egypt agreed to meet and develop a unified Christian law in 1978,
which was sent to the ministry of justice for the People‘s Assembly to review, which
until now has never happened.61 This draft law of 1978 names a few reasons on why a
marriage can be annulled, such as one or both parties being forced to this marriage
(Art.19) or one spouse having an incurable illness or impotence without the other one
knowing before getting married (Art.20). But the only reasons for divorce are
considered adultery or one of them leaving the Christian faith.62
Through a unified Christian legal code and the addition of the second reason
for divorce, the switching of Christian denominations to obtain a judgment based on
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Islamic law would thus cease to exist. I imagine that it was a matter of highest priority
to the church in the end of the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s, to regain total
control over Coptic families and Christian PSL. Sadat changed Article 2 of the
Egyptian constitution (Islamic law being now the main source for legislation since
1980) and as the pope got banished from his post in Alexandria, tensions between
Muslims and Copts and fears among the latter began to rise and intensify. A return to
one‘s own traditions, and rigidly holding onto those is one of the logical reactions and
consequences of feeling constantly threatened. The church here stepped in, where the
state did not, assuming responsibility for the Coptic laity, who were still Egyptian
citizens and thus probably expecting help from the state. Here another divide then
ultimately took place: the one between the state and the church. Ultimately, one of the
main points in this split was in the arena of divorce, as the state kept on granting
divorces basing these on the decree of 1938, while the church stood by its decision
and refused to grant remarriages since Papal decree no 7 of 1971.

2.4 The Copts under Mubarak
Shenouda continued his attitude towards marriage and divorce after his return
under President Hosni Mubarak as well. In 1996, the Pope issued a Papal decree in
which he stated that only the Coptic PSL (which main principles were monogamy
and no divorce except in case of adultery, both of which were based on the Bible)
would rule and judge on Coptic family matters.63 The message here is clear: it was
directed at all those laity members that were looking for a way out, through switching
denominations and thus manipulating the system.
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To meet these threats toward the Christian community, Shenouda called the
various Christian leaders of each denomination to review and revise the draft law of
1978 again, which resulted in an over-worked version in 1998. This draft also has
never been reviewed by state officials.64 In this draft law, the reasons for divorce were
dealt with in Articles 113-115. Article 113 states that divorce is permissible if one of
the spouses abandons the Christian faith and Article 114 allows divorce because of
adultery. The new addition is Article 115, where the definition of adultery is
considerably widened.65 It contained: ―The wife running off with a stranger or
spending the night(s) away from home; letters sent to a third party indicating marital
infidelity; the ―suspicious‖ presence of a stranger inside the family home; a husband
inciting his wife to commit adultery or debauchery; pregnancy that could not be
attributed to the husband due to absence or illness; homosexuality.‖66
Thus in this draft law there are two kinds of adultery. Karimah Kamal calls
these in her book al-zina al-fa’aly (committed adultery) and al-zina al-hikmy (judged
or decided adultery), the latter connecting here with these wider definitions. 67 But in
my opinion, these widening definitions of adultery bear some serious problems and
dangers in them, especially in societies, such as Egypt, where such an act is
considered strong shame not only for the perpetrator but also for the whole family. 68 It
is obvious that the church leaders were trying to somehow connect life in modern
society with the spirit of the Bible, as Jesus himself widened the definitions of
adultery immensely (MT 5;28: ―But I say unto you, That whosoever looketh on a
woman to lust after her hath committed adultery with her already in his heart.‖). But
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here the danger is palpable, the accusations of adultery might truly get out of control
through these loose definitions and could truly lead to everyone accusing everyone of
this act, which means ‗societal suicide‘69 for the accused.
It is understandable and the first logical consequence that the definitions of
these terms are going to be stretched and widened, as the laity is simply not given a
choice in the matter. But it is still important to bear the possible consequences of these
adaptations in mind. In the end though, it comes down to the split between court and
church rulings, as the state still uses the 1938 decree as a basis, which the church has
dismissed since 1971 and thus, two opposing judgments in the same case are the
result. This conflict between the state and the church is explored more thoroughly in
chapter four. It becomes also quite clear that PSL and family law respond to outside
influences and developments as they are created and issued by specific religious
institutions, in Egypt those being the Islamic and the Christian, or here Coptic
institution and code of law. One has to wonder here, how is this legal dualism treated
and understood in and by the Egyptian state? It is evident that Islamic and Coptic
family laws in general, and divorce laws in particular, have been influencing each
other throughout the years, and can be seen as a further reaction to outside pressures
and developments. The attitude on these issues that the Egyptian state has taken on,
underlines this point further.

2.5 The Egyptian State: Unified Laws?
As has been described above, PSL and the influence of religious institutions on
these matters, as well as their attitude towards them have changed and developed over
69
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time in accordance to social and political influences. What is interesting is that in both
religions the family is considered the basic unit of their communities and thus has to
be protected from outside threats. The Egyptian constitution has assumed this attitude,
stating in Article 9, that
The family is the basis of the society founded on religion, morality and
patriotism. The State is keen to preserve the genuine character of the
Egyptian family- with all values and traditions represented by it-while
affirming and promoting this character in the interplay of relations within
the Egyptian society.

This article adopts moreover the religious basis of the family, and thus
granting the religious institutions exceptional control over this institution. One might
wonder, why the religious institutions seek to control the private and family matters of
their laity more than anything else? Muhammad Nur Farhat, Professor of Law and an
interviewee of Karimah Kamal, gives one possible answer. He connects the religious
order of the family to the fact that it is in its basic form the relationship between a man
and a woman, which is encircled by many taboos that might lead to sins. Therefore a
religious leadership to that part of the laymen‘s lives is in order, and religious
institutions are seeking to control these morals and taboos.70 Such a speculation is
further supported by once again adhering to Egypt‘s constitution, which calls all
Egyptian nationals to protect these morals and traditions in Article 12:
Society shall be committed to safeguarding and protecting morals,
promoting the genuine Egyptian traditions and abiding by the high
standards of religious education, moral and national values, the historical
heritage of the people, scientific facts, socialist conduct and public
manners within the limits of the law. The State is committed to abiding by
these principles and promoting them.
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Connecting the family to religious morals, the state is supporting the influence
of religious institutions on these matters as well as attributing the family and its laws
to a divine sphere that is untouchable. As everything else has been placed under the
direction of the state, it is not surprising that the religious institutions are trying to
keep the only area itself, where its influence is still legitimated. Furthermore, it is not
surprising that because the PSL are still based on sacred sources, its jurisdiction
continues to be religious and that these laws have not been part of the unification in
1956, putting Egypt with its dual jurisdiction in these matters in a place between
secularism and religion.
Law 462 of 1956 thus states that non-Muslim jurisdiction is to be continued in
these matters. As we have seen, Article 6 contains the stipulation that this can only be
justified if the litigants belong to the same sect and rite. Here, I want to mention
another stipulation that has to be present in order to apply non-Muslim laws. This
application can only occur when it does not violate Egyptian public policy.71 In order
to understand the position of the state in further chapters of this research, this
stipulation is very important. What is contained in Egyptian public policy?
In general, public policy contains the rules, regulations and norms that define a
national legal order. In the Egyptian case, public policy is a mixture of a community‘s
law that is considered the prevailing one (Islamic law) and that norms, and regulations
are communal, internal affairs,72 which then results in legal pluralism. Nevertheless,
the Egyptian Court of Cassation declared, ―public policy is a secular concept that
applies to all Egyptians regardless of their religion.‖73 Through this secular approach,
public policy is here then an apparatus to convey and support national unity and
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religious coexistence74, which is emphasized by the state as main principles and thus
need to be protected at all costs, as we shall see. National unity might be defined here
as a public general interest, and the aim of public policy is supposed to be the
realization of this interest.75
However, this secular approach is somewhat confined by the means of
achieving this aim, as the court decrees that public policy in Egypt has its roots in
Islam and Islamic law through which this goal can only be realized.76 Here public
policy receives religious undertones, and does thus not truly conform to national unity
and equality before the law as Islamic law is understood to prevail. Yet, public policy
here is based largely on Islamic tolerance for non-Muslim jurisdiction. Maurits Berger
calls this the dhimmi function of Egyptian public policy, as Dhimmis (Christians and
Jews) enjoy a privileged and protected status in Muslim society.77 While public policy
thus results from Islamic legal order, it preserves Christian norms and jurisdiction for
its specific community, as this is an Islamic legal order in itself.78
A good example of this function and of the way the courts issue judgments on
PSL cases is the example of polygamy. Berger recounts how a Christian man argued
that, as he was in a mixed Christian marriage, Islamic law would apply and thus, he
had the right to a polygamous marriage. But the Court of Cassation ruled against this,
with the explanation that polygamy would violate an essential belief of Christian
marriage of all denominations.79 Thus, public policy here protects the essentials and
norms of non-Muslim jurisdiction and it divides between rules, regulations and laws
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for all Egyptians (such as inheritance law for example) and those that adhere to
Muslim citizens only.
This legal dualism, while emphasizing religious tolerance, confines at the
same time national unity and equality before the law of all Egyptian citizens. Thus,
one might wonder if unified PSL would be a possible solution to the problem that the
Copts are facing in regards to divorce and remarriage. There are voices that favor such
a code of law, such as Professor Muhammad Nur Farhat. Farhat promotes a code of
unified PSL for all Egyptians, as it would bring the citizens together and there should
only be one code of law for one country.80 Furthermore, the need to state the religion
of each citizen on their national ID would then become obsolete, as this procedure was
only necessary because of the duality of PSL codes.81
He bases his approach and the possibility of this code on the fact that the
‗pillars of lawmaking‘ and the ways that laws are derived from religious sources in the
case of PSL resemble each other in Islam and Christianity extensively.82 But as
Egypt‘s majority is of Muslim faith, it is only logical that the Copts fear the
application of Islamic law to every aspect of their lives would be the consequence of
such a unified code. Farhat acknowledges this fact, but proceeds that such fears can be
assuaged by establishing this code of law through dialogue, understanding and
tolerance between all parties and institutions. This fear and this apprehensiveness,
which can be found on both sides, he continues, is the reason and the basis for the
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narrow-minded attitudes of religious leaders and the hindrance to dialogue, which
would benefit the nation and its general interest.83
The professor concedes that some essentials of the two faiths are impossible to
unify, such as polygamy or regulations on divorce and that these principles could then
remain specific to each religious community while the rest was unified.84 It is
impossible not to raise the question here though, what would be different then from
today‘s situation? Farhat does not seem to recognize that, while there certainly are
many similarities to Christian and Muslim lawmaking, principles etc., especially when
refraining from using religious texts by the letter but more in interpreting the ‗soul or
intention of the text‘, which he advocates as well85, the true problem lies in the fact,
that some principles are impossible to find a consensus on, without betraying the
religious beliefs of one faction, which would here be the Christians. I do not think that
unification is possible or even sought after in state or in church circles, as the matters
that cannot be unified will remain according to each faith and thus it will be the same
result as it is today, an ambiguity between unification and pluralism where nothing is
really achieved. It is then unified just as an outward appearance, however in reality it
remains divided.

2.6 Concluding Remarks
As this chapter has established, divorce is something that is hated both by
Islam and Christianity and in Coptic Christianity it is only allowed in special
circumstances and stipulations. This in itself is certainly understandable, as society is
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in these two religions understood as being largely based on the intact family and thus
a destruction of this base through loose and easy measures, would consequently
threaten the whole community, including its values, norms and traditions. Yet, if a
family is not intact anymore, there need to be measures to dissolve this unit, in order
for its members to continue living and participating in their specific community.
These measures are then at first mediation, and if all else fails, the specific divorce
laws and stipulations.
As these laws in Egypt, be they Coptic or Islamic, are firstly based on religious
texts, which are hundreds of years old, it is only natural that there needs to be a
distinction between today‘s situation of society and thus families and these texts, as
they might not in all cases fit today‘s reality anymore. It is the role and responsibility
of the religious leaders and institutions then, to understand these realities and their
responsibility in responding to them.86 Connected to this is consequently the
ambivalence and difficulty of calling these laws, which stem from religious texts,
sacred or divine. Through these attributions, the discourse or the opposition to these
becomes virtually impossible, as this would mean an opposition towards God or the
religious institution as a whole, which represents ‗God‘s view‘. It is consequently of
utmost importance to distinguish between divine law and man-made law. Dr. Samir
Tanaghu, Professor of Civil Law at the University of Alexandria, states in an
interview with Karimah Kamal that one of the glaring mistakes and strongest dangers
is the mixing and meshing of those two types of laws. In his approach, any law that is
applied by the state, be it Christian or Islamic, cannot be holy or sacred as it goes
through the interpretations, drafting and wording of human beings and thus loses all
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attributes of divinity, even if it is inspired or based on religion or religious
principles.87
I fully agree with this assertion. A discourse on these laws becomes possible as
the whole issue of these laws as being divine is negated and are thus discussable and
changeable. I think will be the most helpful in the whole debate of Coptic divorce, on
top of the debate Islamic law reform. Both laws are described as being divine and
holy, which gives no space for discussing or changing them, even though they
underwent changes and developments over time and social realities, such as the
Coptic divorce laws for example. PSL in Islam and Christianity do share similarities
throughout history, which are displayed most clearly in times of peace between the
church and the state and a cooperative social and political climate (such as the 1938
decree). The Egyptian state is careful not to discriminate against the Copts in regards
to the laws, emphasizing here the public policy stipulation on Islamic tolerance.
Hence, the church is granted control over the PSL of the Coptic citizens.
The dilemma starts here in that the unified law cannot exist properly because
either it will not be fully unified (in example of divorce) or it will be and Copts will be
living under Islamic law, as this unified law would most probably be based on Islamic
rules and laws. It continues with the church most certainly protesting on the grounds
of equal citizenship rights and the right of practicing one‘s religion freely. Copts
would be discriminated by these laws and become second-class citizens. Yet, at the
same time the church is standing itself in the way through this demand, as the state
gives into it because of the discrimination issue (which is today‘s situation, as there is
no unified PSL).
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Now the church itself discriminates its laity by granting the Coptic Egyptians not the
same rights as the Muslim Egyptians have. Thus divorce is an arena where citizenship
is not only negotiated in a tug-of-war but where it is also limited from either side. It
cannot be just about religion, as the laws have always been based on these texts and
traditions, yet have changed over time and tensions (i.e., the 1938 decree was applied
and recognized by four popes until Shenouda)88 whereas the religious texts did not.
The Coptic citizen is thus made a second-class citizen, if not by the state then
involuntarily by its own church through its strict and rigid response to the state‘s
threat. This chapter‘s aim was to review the theoretical laws in comparison to each
other, and the developments in connection to political and social history. But it is
obvious, that practice can be and usually is entirely different. How these laws are put
into action, the discourse on them, be it in the press, intellectuals or the laity as a
whole in the past as well the present, is reviewed in the following chapter.
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3. DIVORCING COPTS TODAY: THE PUBLIC DISCOURSE
Gamal Nkurmah, a journalist for the Egyptian newspaper al-Ahram Weekly
writes in his article ―Church Weddings‖ in 2008:
The current controversy over divorce and remarriage has emerged as a
contentious issue among Copts and is debated endlessly in the media. (…)
An increasing number of Coptic Christians are converting to Islam and
other Christian denominations where the annulment of marriages is easier.
The curiosity, though, is that this has not always been the case.

The obvious question one has to ask here is: how was it then? Or, how does he
know? An historical review of the Egyptian personal status court system, as well
as the use of these courts is in order to answer this question. Such a review will
also show that the nationalization of the courts in 1956 under President Nasser
did not end legal dualism in Egypt but rather brought about further problems
between the Coptic Church, the Copts and the state. With regards to divorce and
marriage, the Coptic citizens of Egypt sometimes need to choose between the
two basic rights of freedom of religion and equality before the law. When they
are able to divorce like the Muslim citizens, they are consequently equaled to
them in questions of family issues.
But then at the same time the Copts would either overstep the boundaries
of the church or of practicing their religion in absolute freedom and thus not
being able to divorce. This was not the case under Egypt‘s family court system
before the nationalization, where Copts could choose between their own
personal status laws and Islamic laws in different religious courts. The
unification of the courts has surely strengthened the government‘s influence by
centralizing the courts much further. But it has also added some whole new
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dimensions to the power struggle between the church and the state, as well as
the church and its laity members who are looking to divorce, and thus has
caused as many new difficulties as it has solved old ones. To discover, examine
and understand these complexities, a historical review of Copts‘ employment of
the Egyptian family courts is of the utmost importance. Thus, this chapter will
begin with such a review of the history of the Egyptian personal status courts, as
well as the Copts‘ usage of these courts. This background will set up the public
debates among today‘s Copts, the church and the Egyptian government on
Coptic divorce, which in itself has become an arena of struggle and negotiating
citizenship rights of the Copts.
The church as well as the laity is divided on this matter and the sectarian
tensions, which increased over the last 10 years and seem to be ever-present,
play their own part in this tug-of-war between church, state and laity. The
Coptic laity seems to be very aware of the fact that divorce is not only a private,
family issue but also a very public and very political one. This is achieved
through the struggle for equal citizenship rights, which is connected, or rather
expressed through the particularity of divorce and re-marriage judgments that
differ between Egyptian state courts and decisions made by the Coptic Church.
How is this divide expressed? How do Coptic intellectuals as well as
laymen and the clergy argue and about what? When does divorce cease to be a
family matter and become a political one? This chapter attempts to answer all
these questions, which are connected to the public discourse on Coptic divorce
today. But only after setting up the discourse of the past as today‘s questions,
problems and arguments do build on and are developed from the debates on
divorce of Copts, as well as the state‘s and the church‘s role in these
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discussions, as well as the evolution of the Egyptian court system. The
following historical review shall broaden and define the understanding of the
issues and questions that the public discourse of today reveals and poses.

3.1 Historical Review of the Egyptian Courts and the Copts
In principle, in Islamic law, Christians (and Jews) enjoy a special status of
tolerance and protection. These non-Muslims who live in a Muslim society are
considered dhimmis, which means protected citizens. The dhimmis are allowed to
have their own judicial and legislative autonomy over their affairs, including personal
ones such as family law. In the Ottoman Empire, of which Egypt was a province from
1517 until 1914, the status of these ‗protected‘ citizens was abolished in 1856 in order
to ensure the concept of equal citizenship, but the dual judicial system remained and
was also adopted by the Egyptian state after it achieved independence until Nasser‘s
incorporation of the courts in the late 1950s.89 The dual judicial system housed the
shari‘a courts for the Muslims and the milli courts for the non-Muslims.90
Generally before 193791 Egypt had developed four different judicial structures
and trial depended on nationality, religion and the nature of the case. Those four
separate structures consisted of consular criminal courts for foreigners, the Mixed
courts for foreigners‘ civil interests, the Native (later to be renamed National) courts
where Egyptians‘ civil disputes as well as criminal charges against them were tried
and the aforementioned religious courts where personal status cases were adjudicated.
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In 1949, when the twelve-year modification that was decided in Montreux ended,
these courts, with the exception of the family courts, were unified as to further
centralize the judicial system and united under the National court system while the
mixed and foreign courts were eliminated.92
Scholars agree widely that the dual system of personal status courts was founded
in the latter days of the Ottoman Empire.93 For example, through ―the Hatti
Humayoun of 1856, the Ottoman sultan abolished the status of dhimmi and proclaimed the equal treatment of all citizens of the empire. One of the few religionbased differences that were maintained was the judicial and legislative autonomy of
most religious communities.‖94 This means basically, that each religious denomination
would still have its own personal court for personal affairs, such as marriage, divorce
and custody. Such a decree was surely derived out of the Ottoman tolerance towards
other religions‘ rules, customs and traditions on personal issues.
Yet, certain criticisms of the milli courts appeared as early as the 1890s and
grew especially in the 1930s onward. These courts began to be described as ―more
susceptible to corruption than the National courts.‖95 Both Afifi and al-Qattan agree
with this statement, the latter suggesting that the shari‘a courts seemed to be truly
non-discriminative and provided legal protection,96 while Afifi reports that Copts
complained about their corrupt clergy who issued divorces to the rich, who paid large
bribes, while the poor‘s requests were discarded without consideration.97 Signs of the
clergy‘s influence on the laity‘s private lives and matters become obvious here.
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Through their own judicial system, the clergy and religious authorities gained
immense power over their community. Thus, even though I argue that the unification
of the courts brought about serious difficulties and questions to the Coptic community
of Egypt, I do not intend to glorify the dual court system or deem it as a better suited
method to handle personal status cases in Egypt.
This influence might be one of the reasons why in the late 1940s and early
1950s both supporters as well as opponents of Coptic divorces voiced demands for
state interference in the Coptic community. The campaign against the milli courts was
led by journals, such as al-Manar on the divorce-supporters‘ side, demanding the state
to enforce Islamic divorce laws and reform the milli courts to resemble the Islamic
shari‘a courts. Divorce opponents in the Coptic community, on the other hand, voiced
their requests in cases where Copts obtained divorces from shari‘a courts, demanding
that the state should intervene in order to protect Coptic traditions and the Coptic
family. Yet when the Egyptian state tried in 1946 to reform the Coptic personal status
laws strong opposition from the Copts‘ side met the reforms.98
One might wonder if such contradictory demands could be a sign for the lack
of unification in the Coptic community of Egypt, especially in the question of Coptic
divorces. Another question that could be raised here is the issue of state interference
into this matter. A constant fear of preserving community and family as well as
individual freedom to control one‘s private affairs was surely in conflict among the
laity and has not been resolved until today. Other criticisms centered more on the
political and judicial aspect of the whole system of separate courts, which with their
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own laws and procedures, were not compatible with a ―unified, centralized, national
judiciary‖,99 established in 1949 and further pursued by the government, as separate
court systems like these were indeed limiting and weakening the government and its
legal system.100 Furthermore, litigants were logically in the search of their own
benefits, going back and forth between courts, and thus creating tensions and conflicts
between the courts‘ rulings, the litigants‘ views and their religious affiliations.
But it would be premature to judge this kind of dual legal system as an overly
beneficial one for the non-Muslim laity as the new system gave the litigants no choice
but to convert to another denomination or faith altogether, to escape their clergy‘s
influence on a particular issue. These criticisms derive from, as well as name, some of
the problems that legal pluralism creates. A weakened state and strong litigants are
two of the consequences, as individuals can switch among laws and courts as well as
the question of which law is applicable to litigants from different groups,101 such as
Copts who request a divorce, which would be granted in Islam but in Coptic
Christianity it would not be. Such a system gives way to ‗forum shopping‘, 102 a term
to refer to these practices. Through the various legal options, litigants decide on which
level they settle their disputes. Or rather they could take their conflict up to another
judicial level, the national shari‘a court when one was not satisfied with the ruling of
the local milli court, thus manipulating the different legal systems in a way that suits
their personal situations best.103
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While all of these criticisms were expressed and acknowledged, the question
of why the unification and centralization of the family courts were delayed until 1956
raises itself. One of the most logical reasons is the mere complicated nature of the
problem and its potential consequences. Simply put, how should the state undertake
the task of unifying the courts and still allow each citizen to be tried and judged
according to his or her religion in matters of marriage and divorce for example?104
Steadfast and fierce opposition from Muslim judges and the Christian
communities also met the proposition. Muslim judges considered Muslim jurisdiction,
which derived from the shari‘a, as the only lawful jurisdiction, thus the fear probably
existed among them that by unifying the courts, the laws would have to be changed.
Nathan Brown suggests as much in his study, although I am not sure I agree with him,
as Nasser incorporated Islam in the constitution as well and thus, there should have
been no fear among judges that Islamic law would be changed. The Christian clergy
protested because, as their judgments would have to be approved by the National
courts as the draft law stated, their decisions would thus have been put under the
jurisdiction of Muslim judges and Islamic law.105 I would suspect that it was probably
seen from both sides as an intervention of the state to which it had no right, as it was
not only a communal but also a religious matter, where the government should not
have any say.106
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But the government, as Nathan Brown illustrates, suspected as much as well,
and was able to appease these fears, by not changing the content of the laws
themselves and by transferring, at least, the shari‘a judges who together with secular
judges, were to apply religious family law in the special sections of the National
courts that had been created in 1956,107 when Law 462 had abolished the religious
courts.108 ―For the regime, this was the final step in the long-standing policy of
creating a unified and centralized national legal system‖109 even though Law 462
upheld non-Muslim jurisdiction in private affairs as long as both litigants shared sect
and rite,110 meaning that even though the courts were unified, legal pluralism
continued to exist as religious laws were still ruling over family matters. Thus, neither
was the legal system truly unified, nor has it become secular.
Legal dualism has not been abolished as the judgments on personal and private
affairs were still issued based on religion. Proof of this is Law 462 itself, while
unifying the court system and including the milli as well as the shari‘a courts into the
National courts, religious (or confessional) jurisdiction continued to exist and to be
issued. Thus, one cannot truly speak of abolishment, but rather of bringing this
jurisdiction under the state. Consequently, many of the problems of the pre-1956 era
continued to exist, such as switching between laws, as the judgments were still issued
according to the litigants‘ religion, since Law 462 establishes: the non-Islamic laws
would only be applied when litigants were of the same denomination, conversion was
and continued to be a strategy to escape strict rulings of one‘s church.
One did not thus have to change one‘s religion altogether but could instead just
change his denomination to have his case judged by Islamic law. It seems, however,
107

Brown 1997: 68.
Berger 2001: 54.
109
Shaham 2006: 453.
110
Berger 2001: 96.
108

50

that even when both litigants were of the same denomination, for example two
orthodox Copts, and they resorted to a shari‘a court, the judge still ―was responsible
to render justice to anyone who asked for it, including minorities.‖ 111 Consequently,
the courts did not as Brown has noted, ―apply Christian law faithfully (…) (while
Muslims) found themselves under the jurisdiction of judges familiar at best with the
letter of Muslim personal status law.‖112
Al-Qattan also disagrees with Brown because her research found that
Christians ―specifically [did] seek the court for just this purpose‖ of obtaining rulings
based on Islamic law, especially in family or marriage disputes.113 The judges
generally did not reject the dhimmis‘ requests and applied the laws as if the litigants
were Muslims, if such was demanded. Thus the scholarship suggests that the shari‘a
courts were not ―an arena for dhimmi oppression. Not only did dhimmis often and
voluntarily seek its domain, but it also appears that sharia law was consistently and
fairly implemented.‖114 Historical records of the Ottoman Empire and the beginning
of the twentieth century show that Copts were using shari‘a courts for divorce,
especially talaq, the men‘s prerogative of unilateral repudiation, and recording their
marriages in the form of a contract just like Islamic marriages are recorded, where
various stipulations could be asserted by each party.115 Christian women used these
courts as well for the purpose of the wife-instigated divorces, such as khul‗ and
financial benefits that were given to them in Islam but not in Christianity.116 It would
only be logical to assume that were other reasons why non-Muslims adhered to the
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Islamic courts as well, such as financial benefits and of course the option of bigamy or
polygamy.
These records are not only proof that Copts were using the shari‘a courts for
their own benefits, they also show that Islamic laws and regulations must have been
quite known and accessible to them, men and women alike. There thus occurred cases
in the courts of the Ottoman Empire like the one of Mariam bint Saad who went to the
shari‘a court, asking her husband Bolis to divorce her through ibra’a117 to which he
agreed.118 Furthermore, the spouses are passive in the Coptic divorce, which is
administered by the church, and is known as tatliq (judicial divorce), an indirect
divorce instead of talaq, which is based entirely on the couple‘s actions119, proving
once more the church‘s influence over the Copts‘ private lives and affairs.120
Not everyone though accepted such influence into private matters. In 1915, an
Egyptian Coptic wife wanted to sue her husband because of his overspending for legal
incompetence. To protect himself from his wife‘s action, the husband converted to
Islam in order to divorce his wife before she could sue him. The case naturally caused
a public outcry and backlash in the Coptic press.121 But one should not forget that
even though these conditions came into existence, it was still the church that issued
the divorce in this case as well as in general.
While conversion was and is a possible approach to solve private legal matters
with more options, it simultaneously ceases to be a private matter, as after the
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conversion, Islamic law will apply to all legal issues of the convert. All the same, the
actuality of adhering to this strategy was and continues to be a real challenge to the
church‘s authority. In consequence, the Coptic Church has tried over the years to
maintain as much of the control over the Coptic family as possible, showing that while
the state has gained authority and influence over the legal system through the
unification in 1956, the church has become stricter, holding on to the few things it can
still control, such as the PSL and any matters regarding the Coptic family and the
laity‘s personal lives and affairs. One can then conclude that changes in this attitude
and as a result in the laws will not be forthcoming in the near future: ―after all any
attack on these laws has become synonymous to an attack on the Coptic faith in the
eyes of the church.122‖

3.2 The Discourse of Today
A difficulty in analyzing the public discourse on Coptic divorce is that the
Coptic community is not generally partial to discussing church issues in public. This
sensitivity is due to many factors that Karimah Kamal refers to as ‗Egyptian or Coptic
traits‘, such as negativism and the need for submission to some kind of entity or
leader.123 Yet this approach of ascribing such characteristics to a whole of a
population or religious community is more destructive than helpful in analyzing why
Copts tend to keep these issues private and only in extreme circumstances publicly
announce their disagreements and troubles within their community.
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Kamal also mentions various other grounds, such as the understanding of the
Copts in general that their relationship with their church is a private one and that if
one speaks about a dogma or an attitude that the church has taken, it would be
considered the same as speaking against the church itself. 124 Hence, the fear of
standing ‗against‘ the church and thus becoming an outsider of the community, plus
the feeling of the public announcement being basically an invasion to this private
relationship are factors that play an important role, not only in the issue of making this
discourse a public one. They take also part in the general discourse on the ‗Coptic
Question‘ as well as the relationship between the church and its laity and the laity‘s
feeling of isolation that precedes the feeling of unease when discussing such ‗private‘
religious issues in public.
Coptic intellectuals that are contributing to the public discourse acknowledge
this unease. A prominent example is Sameh Fawzy, managing editor of the Coptic
newspaper Watani, journalist, as well as political analyst and specialist in governance
and citizenship, who takes up this issue when talking about the successor of the pope,
a topic that was largely discussed in Egyptian media after Pope Shenouda traveled
abroad due to health problems: ―Many Copts felt uncomfortable about the media
spotlight on change within the church, considering it an intrusion into the pope's life
and a sign of the wish to meddle in clerical affairs.‖125 The government answered such
feelings of intrusion quite clearly through President Hosni Mubarak himself, who
assured that in his opinion ―Copts are capable of solving their own problems without
any intervention.‖126 The Egyptian government consolidates here the attitude, which
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basically amounts to leaving the Coptic Church alone in their own affairs, backing up
the general discourse that the clergy and the pope publish.
If the government intervenes then it is usually connected to sectarian tensions
and the state‘s way of dealing with those is usually through security forces and
rhetoric. Sameh Fawzy here again emphasizes this point and the need for a change of
this approach. ―‘Coptic problems are addressed through the church and state security,
which should not be the case.‘ The ‗Coptic dossier‘, (…), is usually dealt with as a
security, not political, issue, even though Coptic issues should be put on the political
agenda and addressed by the nation's political secular elite.‖127 The state‘s way of
action, or lack of it in regards to sectarian tensions and isolation of the Copts, which
have risen and increased since President Sadat who encouraged the establishment of a
Coptic state within through his policies and reforms, is the reason ―Copts feel that the
‗original‘ state is artificial and complex, one where their interests will not be resolved
(…). They feel they can only be citizens of the church, moving on from it to the
original state.‖128

It becomes increasingly clear through this analysis that the Coptic Church
establishes itself as a state within a state, or rather a body with state-like qualities.
This point is emphasized here since it plays a major part in the public debate on
Coptic divorces. Dependency and maybe even a certain amount of fear of going
against the church are logical consequences of this build-up and the Copts‘ isolation
and understanding of their church as the only entity that protects and pursues their
interests. The fact that the church had to assume the role of the state for the Copts in
Egypt is grounds for this institution‘s political engagement and civil activity.
127
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The church steps in where the state lacks action, thus it cannot be surprising
that the Coptic Church (rather than Coptic citizens themselves) more often than not
approaches government officials when tensions are running high. Magdi Guirguis, a
historian at the American University in Cairo (AUC) proves this point, as he is quoted
by Dina Ezzat in her Al-Ahram article: ―The Church, rather than the state, is perceived
by many Copts as their ultimate representative in civil as much as religious
matters.‖129 The author goes on to say, ―The state has failed to live up to the
expectations of either Copts or Muslims, creating a vacuum that it was inevitable that
religious institutions would seek to fill.‖130 An area where Coptic laity and clergy
alike criticize the state‘s inattentiveness to their needs and demands is in the arena of
full citizenship rights for Copts.

An outstanding point of Copts‘ condemnation is Article 2 of the Egyptian
constitution, which states that the Islamic shari‘a is the main source for Egyptian
legislation and which then consequently would give Copts a status of second-class
citizens. While Bishop Morqos, the official spokesman of the Orthodox Church in
Egypt has asked for altering the wording of the article, Nabil Gabriel, a Coptic lawyer
and human rights activist, calls for its abolishment altogether.131 It is problematic that
a constitution has such religious undertones and it certainly backs discriminations on a
legal and governmental level to a certain degree. Mohamed Hamed El-Gamal, former
head of the State Council, however, answers that full citizenship rights are given by
the same constitution to Copts and a change of Article 2 is not going to change
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people‘s minds and put a stop to sectarian incidents.132

The problematic might not lie here in the fact alone that sectarian tensions are
a reality in Egypt, but that the governmental outlook on legislature and the state‘s
character is in fact a religious one. If the state were to change this article, it would
certainly prove good intentions and a step towards its Coptic citizens but the
government has to take Egypt‘s Muslim population into consideration as well.
Nevertheless, citizenship of the Copts becomes an issue here, as this article gives
Egypt‘s constitution and the Egyptian state itself an Islamic character, which makes
the Copts‘ worries and fears, that they become second-class citizens and thus would
face discriminations that are backed by the state and its laws, all the more tangible and
understandable. Full citizenship would not be granted to the Copts in an Islamic state.

Now the question might be raised of how such demands of full citizenship and
fears of being treated unequally connect and build upon the divorce of the Copts. An
excellent example to illustrate this vibrant connection with all its complicated
political, legal and religious undertones is a divorce case that set off public
discussions on both sides, Muslim and Coptic, not only on the issue of Coptic divorce
but on Coptic citizenship as well. In 2007, 45 Copts converted to Islam in order to
obtain a divorce but the Ministry of Interior, which a Cairo Administrative court
ruling supported, did not allow them to convert back to Coptic Christianity after their
divorces were finalized.133

Coptic clergy and lay members protested over such a ruling, Gabriel calling it
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a ―black day for the Copts‖134 and Bishop Anba Daniel ―argued the ruling ‗contradicts
all principles of democracy, human rights and citizenship‘.‖135 Both, Gabriel and
Anba Daniel connected this court‘s decision with Article 2 of the constitution again,
as it is a ruling based on the Islamic dogma. Gabriel was especially determined to link
the ruling to Islamic legislation: ―All talk of equal citizenship has been rendered
meaningless by this ruling which exposes the kind of religious state in which we are
living.‖136 While Gabriel fully acknowledged that these Copts converted to Islam
simply to dissolve unhappy marriages, Rafiq Habib, a prominent Coptic thinker,
answered this acknowledgement that there should be no reason to become upset over
the whole issue as no one should use religions and creeds as easily as this to simply
escape unhappy marriages.137 The first traces of a split in the Coptic laity become
visible here in regards to the discourse on divorce and citizenship. Indeed, it has been
noted that the same court under judge Faruk Abdel-Qader has granted several cases of
reconversion in 2006, previous to this particular case. Therefore, the argument goes,
the ruling has more to do with the particularity of the case instead of the principle of
religious freedom or full citizenship rights.138

I think it is very interesting to note here that neither clergy nor lay members
actually mention that these Copts were granted the divorce that they were seeking,
which would not have been granted by the Church as these Copts used conversion as a
way out, but are solely focusing on the citizenship issue. It is especially remarkable
that the clergy does not even pretend to argue the divorce side of the whole case but
only speaks up at the citizenship question, which is concerned with the re-conversion
134
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of these Copts and basically their freedom of religion. This observation gains in
peculiarity when read alongside the church‘s reactions on a particular case of 2006,
where judge Faruk decided in favor of Atef Kirollous, who sued the Coptic Church to
obtain a license of re-marriage after his civil divorce. The ruling stated, that the
church was obliged to hand permits out to divorcees, who wanted to marry again.139
While the court based its decision on the Egyptian constitution, which granted
everyone the same civil rights, such as the right to marriage and to start a family, the
church rejected this ruling strongly, understanding it as a state interference into a
purely religious domain. Pope Shenouda reacted strongly towards the court, while he
conceded that granting divorces fell under the judges‘ responsibilities, marriage did
absolutely not and was only administered and controlled by the church.140

Such contradictory reactions reveal the double standards of the church and the
state in the discourse on Coptic divorce and Coptic citizenship. While, in one case the
government did not grant the Copts full citizenship rights and was acting as a religious
state would, in the next case it granted the Coptic lay member a full and equal
citizenship status but then meddled in religious affairs where it should have no say in
the church‘s opinion. It is unmistakable that the issue here is not divorce alone but
stems from a constant threat the Coptic community feels it is under. In both lawsuits,
the question of divorce led immediately to the question of influence and the owner of
this influence, be it over the family or the religious choices of the perpetrators. In both
cases, the court‘s rulings posed a direct threat to the Coptic community, while in one it
lost a relatively big number of members, on the other the church was ordered by the
state to do something that was going against its laws and, more importantly, its creed.
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The implication is clear: the struggle is as much about control as it is about
divorce. What is interesting to note here is that the debates over Coptic divorce is put
into a largely political framework. Both the spokesmen of the Egyptian administration
and the Coptic Church refer to citizenship and the political make-up of Egypt, and
thus the issue of Coptic divorce is mostly discussed in political tones. Only seldom
does the Coptic Church refer to the religious issues involved, and this only happens in
regards to the question of the divorcees‘ remarriage, as we shall see. These double
standards and double meanings in this discourse add a deeper complicatedness to
everyone‘s actions and attitudes. In March 2008 the Supreme Administrative Court
issued two court rulings on Coptic divorce. The first ruling obliged the Ministry of
Interior to permit the official re-conversion of Christians to Christianity after
converting to Islam to obtain a divorce, such as in the case of the 45 Copts in 2007.
The second court ruling was directed at the church, though, obliging it to permit remarriage to all Coptic divorcees, regardless of why the divorce was issued by the state
in the first place, as the state was still relying on the 1938 decree that Copts
themselves had issued. While the church celebrated the first ruling as a victory and
connected it to the civil state, it rejected the second vehemently, connecting it to a
religious state.141

The court defended itself by stating that it would, with these two rulings
protect the citizenship rights of the Copts and the Coptic Church would act unlawfully
if it did not allow these marriages to become official. Yet the Pope refused to accept
these rulings and referred to the fact that these marriages would not take place in
Church and thus would never be recognized, a statement that the judiciary took
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exception to.142 As Sameh Fawzy concludes in his Daily News Egypt article ―For
Copts, it‘s a matter of choice‖, these two court rulings have a civil basis and the
church is the one with the double standards here. He continues, ―The civil state (…)
should not have double standards. Christians have to decide whether they want to be
treated as equal citizens in a civil state, or as second-class citizens in a religious state.
It is unacceptable to swing from ‗civil law‘ to ‗religious law‘ only to maintain a
privileged position.‖

Even though this rather bold statement bears some truth in it, the issue of
choice is a problematic one to say the least. True, the civil state should not have any
double standards as the Coptic Church practices them in respect to PSL. Yet it is also
not compatible with a civil state that some members would have to choose between
different basic freedoms and rights. A civil state grants these to every member,
regardless of religion, thus, there should be no choice and hence I cannot agree with
Fawzy that these rulings stem from a civil perspective. It rather proves that Egypt is
somewhere in between a civil and religious state, and in this debate it seems that even
the church cannot make up its mind of what it would prefer Egypt to become.

But it would be wrong to say that the church, or rather the clergy is united on
to the issue of when and why divorces and remarriage licences should be granted, or
rather on the whole discourse on divorce. Karimah Kamal tells of priests who, for a
large sum of money, re-married divorcees even without the pope‘s permission. The
church then sued these priests on account of forgery and fraud but lost this litigation
since the priests were acting by the law, just not the church law. 143 But as Kamal here
does not produce any kinds of dates nor examples, citing actual clergymen might be
142
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more productive. Priest Akram Lamaey, a biblical theology professor, was of the
opinion that the decree of 1938 actually ―better grasped the spirit of the Bible.‖144 He
continued that while 1938 was during a liberal period in Egypt‘s history, where the
Holy Synod could pass decisions and laws on its own, today the pope‘s supporters
govern it, after he decides who becomes a member and thus only chooses people loyal
to him and his outlooks.145

It is difficult to find clergy voices in the discourse who would speak in public
against the pope. Even here, the critique is kept in check and is directed more to the
system and the changes and developments that took place over time in general. This
fact, that such voices are so hard to find, stems probably again from the fact of the
general sensitivity of discussing these church matters in public, especially in regards
to clergy members, as they represent that church. Furthermore, the fact that there are
no actual laws to which the Coptic Church of today adheres, but rather needs in every
divorce case the Pope‘s opinion on it, is proof that the Copts are actually kept in the
dark and that divorce of Copts is an arena for power struggles. This in itself is a power
tool of the Church and of course, the Pope as every decision traces back to him. Since
there are no written laws, nobody is able to criticize them, and thus unity is
propagated and demonstrated to the outside. This outward appearance of unity is of
course, a sign of strength and mutual understanding that these attitudes are protected
and shared by the whole church and thus cannot be wrong or debated, is a goal that is
not only the church‘s but the state‘s too, as the research will show.

In general though, it is safe to say that two trends have developed in the Coptic
Church. The first is resorting to interpretation, recognizing some reasons for divorce
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as serious as adultery and thus these should be considered as valid. They base their
attitude on the fact that the 1938 decree has been in usage under four popes. The other
trend, which developed after 1971, is not as flexible, basing its views on the bible and
Shenouda‘s decrees on divorce. But it does accept impotence and insanity as further
possible reasons for divorce, but only if such an illness was concealed to the other
spouse before they were married.146 The disunity on this point in regards to the laity is
much more public and openly discussed than is the clergy‘s. Basically, as soon as
Copts are divorcing for reasons other than adultery, one can speak of disunity, as these
Copts oppose the Pope‘s decrees. The divide among the clergy into two trends can be
found within the laity as well. While one side is supporting the Pope‘s decrees and
decisions, which are based on the exact verses of the Holy Bible, the other side is
looking to unite today‘s realities with the holy texts as well as with the history of
Coptic divorce laws.

Karimah Kamal positions the split of the laity on the realities of life: those
who do not support the church‘s attitude because they are suffering in a broken
marriage and those who live a whole family life and thus side with the church. The
enemies of divorce will never understand the supporters and cannot fathom what it
means to be in a broken marriage if they have not experienced it. Thus they are not
even open to discussions as these dogmas and rules are understood as holy. 147 While
this is an approach that certainly has a basis and a lot of truth in it, it also disregards a
lot of Copts that are open to discussions and re-interpretations of the laws and that are
not burdened with an unhappy marriage.

Often these Copts have a public voice, such as intellectuals or human rights
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activists. But the whole of the public discourse makes it obvious that there is a certain
number of Copts that do question the divorce and marriage laws of the church,
especially in regards to human and citizenship rights.148 ―Increasing numbers of Copts
(…) want the church to take human and citizenship rights into account. Many
Christians are yearning for the ‗hegemonic control of the Coptic Church over the
Coptic laity‘ to be curtailed,‖ says Mariz Tadros, assistant professor of political
science at the American University in Cairo.149 Akram Habib, a member of the
Secularist Coptic Trend150, concedes that Copts are probably afraid that the loosening
of the divorce laws would result in huge numbers of divorces. But he continues that
forced living in an unhappy marriage would be a bigger problem.151

Lawyer Mervat Abu Tij, who was interviewed by Karimah Kamal, makes an
excellent point in connection to Habib‘s worries. She rightly observes that a family
that is held together by force cannot benefit the society. It will not be committed to
religious values towards each other or towards society. In her opinion, the religious
leadership needs to keep here the social realities in mind and understand the
responsibilities it has towards the laity, which truly longs for the Church‘s blessing on
their lives‘ choices. But if it is not given to them, lay members must resign to
converting to another sect or even another religion altogether.152

It sometimes seems the church would lose much more by clinging to its
strictness than by granting divorces and remarriage permits to unhappy spouses. This
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is not to suggest that divorce should be made so easy that it becomes possible with
every little problem. But it is understandable, if not obvious, that a Coptic couple will
become disillusioned by the church and thus by its dogmas and decisions if they are
forced to continue to live in a broken marriage and home. Thus, from a logical
perspective this might cost the church more than a divorce would. The question might
be raised here of why the Coptic Church does not seem to consider this train of
thought. ―The problem with clerics is that they have an idealised (sic!) concept of
marriage. The leaders of the Coptic Church know nothing about the pitfalls of married
life, (says) Coptic novelist and columnist Mageed Tobia. (…) The imposition of
further restrictions by the church on the rights of Copts to divorce and marry (…)
would be incompatible with full citizenship and universal human rights. It is against
human nature. It defies reason and logic.‖153

Tobia alludes to reason and logic, two characteristics that are brought up in the
public discourse by a significant number of intellectuals. Dr. Muhammad Nur Farhat
has pointed out that there is a certain separation between today‘s realities and religious
texts.154 To overcome this split, he suggests that lawmaking has to be based on the
‗soul of the text and not its letter‘, meaning that the intention of the texts has to be
taken into account as much as its mere wording in order to arrive at a law that is
fitting today‘s social realities.155 Dr. Mikhail, another interviewee of Kamal,
elaborates on this point of view. In order to derive at laws, or even certain meanings
of religious texts, one has to look at them as well as on ways to interpret them. There
needs to be a differentiation between ‗its intent and its letter‘, just like Fattah
suggested. But Mikhail bases his opinion on the Bible itself; Christ has given men
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reason and the ability to think and interpret.156 Furthermore, the Bible has the intent to
‗widen the horizons‘ of people‘s minds and does not allow them to confine and limit
themselves to mere words of a text. Christ himself has shown this intent, by saving the
adulteress by saying to the Pharisees who were accusing her; ―He who is without sin
among you, let him throw a stone at her first (JH 8;7).‖ The Christian faith‘s foremost
aim is thus the ‗protection of the soul‘ and not the condemnation of sins.157

This approach shows yet another side of the discourse on Coptic divorce,
which is not based on citizenship but first and foremost on religion and its texts. It
would be wrong to call this a divide in the pro-divorce discourse itself but it is
interesting to note here how this Coptic discourse mirrors the Islamic one, in regards
to using one‘s religion as a basis for demands, such as PSL reforms. While in the
Coptic case, both approaches do not necessarily contradict each other, it is important
that they find a voice here, as both are integral to the discourse among the laity and as
someone, who is pro-divorce reforms is not necessarily unreligious. Milad Hanna, a
Coptic intellectual, for example, ―conceded that divorce in Christianity is only
possible in the case of adultery. But, he expressed the view that, in light of current
social realities, those Copts separated from their spouses should be able to divorce
them and marry others.‖158

The issue of remarriage has especially sparked a lot of controversy. This issue
is elaborated in the next chapter but it serves well to show here the ambivalence and
the uncertainty of the Coptic laity in the debates on divorce, as divorce itself is a state
matter but remarriage is a church one. Thus, the latter is the point where the whole
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issue becomes truly complicated and the question of loyalty or resistance towards the
church is raised. Saad Zaghlul, a Coptic lawyer, believes that the court ruling of
March 2008, which obliges the Coptic Church to remarry divorcees, is proof ―that the
court is trying to impose its rules and belief on Christian teachings. With this ruling, it
is trying to force both Churches (Coptic and Catholic) to abide by the sharia
principles. (…) (and) that such rulings prove that extremist thinking dominates both
the executive and judicial authorities.‖159 Yet, Albert Mashraky, a Coptic engineer,
does not agree. He understands this ruling to be an attempt to deal with the Coptic
divorce problem with which the state has been faced. All the same, ―he believes no
one, including the government, has the right to interfere with the Church's affairs.‖160

The ambivalence becomes apparent here. While concessions are made to the
government and clearly, a certain kind of understanding is achieved, the opinion still
presides, that church matters should stay inside the church. While it is difficult to find
clergy voices in the public discourse who favor the loosening of divorce laws, it is
surprisingly difficult to find laity voices that are against that. One theory might be that
because Al-Ahram Weekly is a state-issued newspaper there is a certain aim and intent
in publishing stories of a divide between clergy and laity. As the mouthpiece of the
National Democratic Party (NDP), the party of the president, its main focus is to
spread a particular viewpoint or even just a feeling or nuance on a topic, such as
Coptic divorce, in order to make its position on it more understandable, defendable
and of course, more popular amongst the citizenry, and here especially the Copts. Of
course, these opinions can also possibly be of the journalists as well. However, while
a divide between the clergy would go too far in meddling with church affairs, a
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display of enemies of easy divorces in the laity might be counterproductive to the
state‘s aim, which is to bring all family matters under its control, as any centralized
state has, while not losing its legitimacy among the Coptic population through such a
move of further centralizing family and personal matters.

Only Karimah Kamal has given an example of a Coptic voice, a letter
addressed to her by a Sonya Halim that is siding with the Pope and the church in the
question of Coptic divorce laws. Halim here proves the point that Kamal made earlier
in her study on the ‗public sensitivity‘ of Copts. She addresses the fact that internal
church matters should stay internal and that no one other than the pope has the right to
decide on them.161 The letter also shows how misinformation has been circulated
among the Coptic laity, or at least around this particular lay member, as she condemns
the fact that Islamic law as governed family matters of Copts in Egypt for 30 years
and that a sympathetic and tolerant government should not put Christians under such
an Islamic government.162 Halim continues in her letter that marriage is a holy bond
where two spouses essentially become one and it can only be broken by adultery. This
is God‘s law and no one has the right to change this law. Many principles of the
Christian faith play, in her opinion, into marriage life and its laws, such as ―Love your
enemies, bless them that curse you, do good to them that hate you (…) (MT 5;44)‖ or
―(…) Render therefore unto Caesar the things which be Caesar's, and unto God the
things which be God's (LK 20;25).‖163

Her main opinion is here, that one should not be egotistical but humble and
bear what God has given them, if only for the sake of the children and a godly life,
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mentioning the Coptic dogma that ‗the home is like the church‘, thus if Satan enters
this home God will consequently leave it.164 This letter demonstrates a lot of Coptic
dogmas and beliefs, and it seems that the writer as raised with Coptic traditions and
main principles, such as perseverance, humbleness as well as a certain kind of
determinism and submission to what ‗God has given‘.

Both sides of the debate use religion and religious texts on which to base their
arguments and opinions. Thus, it becomes a question if this is really the best or the
most promising approach as a counter argument can be formed and presented so
easily. For every verse on opening the human consciousness and mind to
interpretation and still living a virtuous life, there is another that speaks of clear rules
and strictness on certain matters, such as divorce. Regardless of the divided opinions
of the laity though, until now Pope Shenouda remains the sole authority on the issue.
―No power on earth can force the Orthodox Church to do anything against the words
of the Holy Bible, or against its own conscience. Whoever marries a divorced Copt
without license from the clerical council ... I will defrock him whatever his rank might
be, the Coptic Pope warned.‖165

Such strong words do not leave room for any doubt on his position on Coptic
divorces, remarriage licenses and these laws. It is a fact that the Pope is the last
authority through which these laws have to go through and thus Pope Shenouda
ascribes the courts civil authority but not religious power.166 Yet on purely religious
issues, he remains the last authority and according to him, all debates and discourses
of opinions and approaches are nullified, when the issue, such as marriage and
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divorce, is a strictly religious one.167 Thus it becomes obvious here, that those who
manipulate religion and law in Egypt to achieve their goals, are certainly not in the
Pope‘s favour to say the least. In his opinion people, such as these ―want to make
religion subservient to their personal interests and do not want to submit themselves to
the rules of religion.‖ 168

When Islamic law is applied in situations when one of the litigants of a divorce
case converts to another Christian sect, Pope Shenouda has asked the government, to
apply the unified Christian law that has been drafted by the heads of the main
churches in Egypt in 1998.169 This is truly a serious loophole of the PSL in Egypt and
the pope acknowledges this time and again: ―(…) (He) argued (in the interview) that
while the church has nothing against the Shari'a, he does not see why it should be
applied to a Christian couple.‖170 The Pope‘s attitude here is certainly understandable,
and a unified Christian draft does seem like a reasonable solution to this problem. But
there are critics of this draft as well, calling it incompatible with human rights because
of the stipulations on divorce and conversion to another sect. 171 But the Pope‘s answer
is ―that everyone is free to change his or her denomination or religion provided that
this is done out of conviction and not convenience. He added that these allegations
were groundless. We respect human rights, (…) and they are fully guaranteed in the
new bill -- provided they cause no harm. It is the human right of divorced Christians
to remarry, but it is also our right to say that we, as a Church, reject this right because
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it is not compatible with our teachings.‖172

While Pope Shenouda‘s opinion is understandable, especially in the case of
his, observation that if divorce ―is made easy, then everyone will want one (and) as a
result, people will start choosing their partners in a casual, offhand way, without
understanding the seriousness of the commitment they are entering into.‖ 173 But it is
not helpful, while admitting that divorcees should have the right to remarry, to also
acknowledge that it is the church‘s right to reject these marriages. The status quo is
not going to change or improve with observations, such as these. But Pope Shenouda
seems to be aware of that fact.
These conflicts that are raised out of the contradictory judgments between
judiciary and church can be solved as well through a unified Christian draft, in the
pope‘s opinion. It would ease the judges‘ work extensively as they could refer to a
single authority, the unified law, when issuing court rulings. The draft would thus
bring about reconciliation between church and court rulings, nullifying the main
conflict between the two actors.174 Therefore, in regards to discussing solutions to the
problem of the diversity of rulings in a divorce case, and no less the predicament the
litigants are put into, as they have basically to choose between their church and their
state, the pope is convinced of the unified draft‘s ability to serve as a compromise
between church and state. Thus, the pope is placing the full responsibility to solve this
conflict on the state, as the church has done its part by drafting the law: ―I hope they
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give the personal status law the attention it needs, because it will synchronize judicial
and church rulings. Even Islam calls for this.‖175
―Until then (when the unified Christian law will be applied), the Church will
remain steadfast against the legal system‘s orders with regard to remarriage. The court
interfered in what is not under its realm of jurisdiction, because religion does not fall
under the administration of the state, says Ramsis Naguib, a Copt who has spent
almost 30 years working as a lawyer (…). This decision belongs to the people who are
practicing the religion, not to the state. The state‘s mission here is only to bless the
decision, not to make one. So it is inappropriate for the court to force the
Ecclesiastical Council to do anything.‖176

While again this is certainly the church‘s right, it also establishes the church as
a state within the Egyptian state again, in regards to PSL and especially divorce here.
This fact is attributed to the fact that the church, and thus Pope Shenouda, has come to
exclusively represent the Coptic community in front of the state. ―This is the problem
of a government that lacks the capacity to implement public policies in the area of
religious tolerance in Egypt. To fill the vacuum, the government turns to religious
leaders, including Pope Shenouda, for support. As a result, the political spectrum has
become more complicated and divided along religious lines.‖177

The consequences are grave, not only in regards to divorce. The Egyptian
government becomes of second-grade importance to the Coptic citizen, as he turns to
the church first, which then addresses the government for him. Thus, no real
interaction can take place and the Coptic community is further isolated from public
175
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life. The main result, especially in regards to the peculiarity of divorce, is a vicious
cycle: While the church can be understood as a state within the state, with as much
legitimacy, political power and communication to the laity, it will be able to issue or
reject divorces and re-marriage permits, regardless of what the Egyptian courts decide.
The status of its own ‗state‘ is thus even more testified and enshrined in these
judgments. Added to these issues is the question of citizenship and full citizenship
rights of the Copts, which will either be limited by the Egyptian government, or the
Coptic Church itself, both acting on the intention not to lose influence and control
over the Coptic citizens / laity.
The issue of citizenship is then brought back to the Coptic Church, which is
understood widely to be the representative of the Coptic community and thus, is the
one who demands, grants and ensures these rights, even though this would be the task
of the Egyptian government in a civil state. Thus, this would be here once more a
proof of Egypt, neither being a truly civil nor a true religious state, where a religious
institution represent a considerable number of citizens and thus is granted authority by
the state, which in turn is exercised over the laity, which looks up to it.
3.3 Concluding Remarks
As the personal status laws still follow sectarian lines on both sides, Egypt‘s
ambiguous status between religion and secularism creates the church as a state within
a state at least in regards to personal status and family law issues. Two different and
competing judgments can be issued and valid at the same time and in the exact same
case, for example when applying the Muslim canon law, a divorce could be issued on
the grounds brought forward by the litigants but when applying Coptic canon law it
could not. Thus even after nationalization and unification in 1956, legal dualism has
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not ceased to exist but has developed further problems for Coptic citizens: What is
more important, equality before the law or freedom of religion? Are they a traitor to
the state or to their church?
It becomes clear that the Coptic laity as well as the clergy is divided on the
question of divorce and how this particular matter should be handled best. Divorce
itself becomes a field of negotiation between state, church and laity here and raises the
questions of citizenship rights, a civil state and a code of civil laws. The state usually
tries to stay out of church matters (such as the pope‘s succession) and thus, it becomes
only a matter of negotiation through the laity that is standing up against the church‘s
dogma, asking for divorce or re-marriage permits that the church refuses to grant but
the government officials do not.
The question of negotiation becomes even more complicated through the fact
that sectarian tensions are running high and seem to be more prominent than ever for
about the last 10 years. For example the Al-Ahram Weekly Newsreel of the first week
of March 2010 includes out of three articles, two on tensions of various kinds between
Muslims and Copts. A further difficulty bears the fact that Copts do not support the
notion of discussing church matters in public. They are thus contributing to their
isolation as well as supporting the state in only discussing ‗Coptic‘ matters as
questions of security and not on the political agenda. The public discourse proves
though that the Coptic laity seems to be very aware of the fact that divorce is here not
only a private, family issue but becomes a very public and very political one.
This is the case when lay members stand up against this feeling of isolation /
privacy and draw these issues out in the open. The problematic of the tug-of-war
between church and government is ever-present in the struggle of divorce and
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remarriage licenses and once again, it becomes clear here that divorce is an arena not
only for negotiating citizenship rights but rather for control over these rights and the
choice is before the Coptic citizen: equality before the law or practicing religion
freely? Civil or Islamic state? This is the problematic itself in its core: there should be
no choice as every citizen in a civil state should be the same. And divorce makes this
problematic, through the issuing of two different judgments all the more clear.
The Coptic Church, as Karimah Kamal notes, has always had a strong
presence in the lives of the Copts and strives to uphold its influence and its traditions,
but before the unification of the courts, the Copts had at least the choice of adhering to
the Coptic or the Muslim courts to settle their disputes.178 I think it can be safely
assumed that the enemies of divorce in the Coptic Church always tried to ensure the
perpetuation of these traditions and condemned the members of the laity that have
gone against those rules. But I also think the strictness the laity members encounter
today in regards to the matters of divorce is also the church‘s reaction to the sectarian
tensions that have risen especially in the 1970s and 1980s. Thus, one always has to put
the actions of the different actors in their historical contexts. But I think that the
unification of the courts has played a role in worsening the situation for the Copts as
well, as this process has not ended legal dualism but has just brought different forms
of laws into one court.
While before unification, the application of the laws and the personal status
courts were a purely religious matter, handled by each religious institution, and thus
neither a secular nor a state matter really, which it has now partly become. The
struggle of divorce and personal status laws has thus developed into a power struggle
between state and church, which in itself bears state-like qualities for the Copts as it
178
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becomes the sole civil representative of them as a community: There are now secular
judges, appointed by the state, to apply religious law, consequently I think the
unification has brought about a double threat in the eyes of the church, which only
reaction can be rigidity: not only is the Coptic family in danger, it is threatened by a
state apparatus who declares itself as being Islamic.
Therein lies basically the conflict that Copts are faced with ever since the
unification of 1956 and the increasing strictness of the church in contemporary times:
rebelling against these motives and views of the church would basically mean to
threaten and maybe even destroy the Coptic identity and community, or at least the
Coptic Church and its devote followers portray it this way. On the other hand,
everyone is looking for their own benefits and the easiest way out of complicated and
unfortunate situations, such as an unhappy marriage. The problematic of this aspect
today lies in the fact, that every Copt who faces such a struggle, like obtaining a
divorce for other reasons than adultery for example, will ultimately be confronted with
this basic question: are you for or against the church in these difficult times?
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4. THE STATE AND THE CHURCH
While the legal as well as the religious level of the debates on Coptic divorce
has been illustrated and examined, this chapter shall deal with the political nuances of
this highly controversial topic. As it is, the discourse on Coptic divorces in Egypt can
be used as an example to illustrate the state-like qualities the Coptic Church has in
Egypt. In order to analyze this position of the church in connection to the struggle on
Coptic divorce and its laws, it is necessary to demonstrate how this status of the
Coptic Church came to be, which is basically the result of a reciprocal relationship
between the state and the church that developed under President Nasser and Pope
Kyrillos. Furthermore, it is once more necessary to illustrate, how sectarian tensions
and the threat of those, deepen the church‘s feeling of responsibility for the Coptic
laity and the Coptic family, which has to be protected from this kind of violence at all
costs. These tensions thus, play again a significant role in the struggle over the control
of Coptic personal status laws (PSL), the Coptic family and the Coptic community, as
a whole and thus need to be connected to the power struggle between the Coptic
Church and the Egyptian state.
The choice then of being for or against the church, the Coptic community
faces is connected to the understanding of citizenship in Middle East and North
African (MENA) countries. As the church represents the Coptic community in front of
the state, the natural consequences are a feeling of responsibility of the church
towards the community, in exchange for loyalty and support. One might wonder
though, why the church has not accepted the influence of the civil state in questions of
Coptic affairs, especially when these affairs are private.
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Karimah Kamal explains that in the past the priest of a community knew every
single member of this community individually, as well as his or her family, work and
private affairs and problems. Consequently, the priest of each commune assumed the
role of the mediator and had a lot of influence in the private affairs of the Copts, as he
personally knew the issues and parties involved.179 However now, the author goes on
to say, this power and influence becomes highly questionable as the clergy does not
and cannot fully grasp the individual private affairs, issues and problems of each
community member, as this community has grown and the personal knowledge of
priests about their community members and their personal lives and problems has
become close to non-existent.180 Many factors, such as the growth of the Coptic
community, urbanization and migration to other countries, have contributed to the loss
of this influence.
Kamal favors the citizenship model of the West where each citizen is
individually and directly connected to the state and not through a second mediator or
representative. It is doubtful, though, that the Egyptian government itself favors this
model as well. The state‘s first and foremost principle and aim is the protection and
propagation of ‗national unity‘, which is naturally endangered and threatened by
sectarian tensions. An outcome of the establishment of this ‗national unity‘ is of
course the goal and intention of remaining in power. Thus, the Egyptian government
does not call the incidents examined below sectarian but rather individual cases of
violence. The state takes on an ambivalent attitude. While it prefers to deal with these
cases through the Coptic Church instead of with the issue directly, when it comes to
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divorce the state seeks to ‗defend the individual‘s right‘ of the Egyptian citizen to
divorce and remarry.
Such ambivalence bears a clear foreshadowing of a power struggle or clash of
wills between the state and the church. This power struggle is connected to the fact
that the PSL in Egypt are based on religion. It also indicates, that the struggle between
the church and the state in political terms, is not so much about Coptic divorces as it is
about control over the Coptic laity and their private and family affairs. This conflict
becomes all the more complicated and deep as the church has practically the right to
demand such influence and control as it is propagated and recognized as the Copts‘
political and civil representative.
The Coptic laity is thus put in the middle of the tug-of-war between the church
and the government over the control of the Coptic citizen‘s private affairs, being
disappointed in the state‘s lack of action and thus turning to the church for
representation as well as protection. It is clear that this comes at the price of giving up
the control over their decisions regarding their personal lives. The pressure to submit
to the church‘s dogmas in loyalty and preserving of this holy entity is included in this
‗agreement‘ between church and laity as well. Divorce and remarriage is thus the
arena for negotiating the citizenship of and the control over the Coptic community as
a whole, and not just about the individual cases of broken families.
But it would be wrong to assume that this loyalty to the Pope and the church is
given involuntarily. This only happens in the case of disagreements between
individual members of the community and a certain doctrine, like the granting and
recognizing of divorces, but not in a general sense. In Coptic Orthodox dogma,
though, the patriarch is understood and honored as ―the father of the flock, symbol of
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the faith and figurehead of the community.‖181 Of course one cannot generalize here
and the community as a whole is especially divided on the Pope‘s decisions on the
PSL. But what is meant here is that the average Copt presumably feels connected to
his church precisely because it is the institution—one of a holy faith and dogma—that
protects and represents him or her.
As the church fills the gaps that the state cannot or is unwilling to fill, for
Copts there is a predicament of state. When such a crisis occurs, Fiona McCallum
concludes, religion takes on a political character as the ―state tends to be bureaucratic,
inefficient and unable to respond to these problems (that the community faces).‖182
The role of the church as a representative of the Copts becomes once more
understandable and tangible, which connects to the Copts‘ ebbing between church and
state. While the latter gives the Copts a national identity, one, which is strong as we
have seen, the religious institution provides these citizens with an authentic identity183
that only through the power struggles and the see-saw in affairs of PSL between the
two entities becomes excluding to the national one, as the church takes over the role
of the state for the Coptic citizens.
Thus, the Pope of the Coptic Church has responded to the Copts‘ fears,
problems and dilemmas in three ways: spiritually, socially and politically. By
providing social, or even civil, services the church has responded to the gaps left by
the government with educational courses as well as organized leisure time for the
youth and literacy programs.184 By becoming the representative of the Coptic
community, Pope Shenouda has additionally filled a political space left open by the
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Egyptian government.185 As the Pope has become the spokesman of the Copts and
provided them with social as well as spiritual services, an authentic and strong
identity, protection and the knowledge that there is an institution people can turn to in
need, it is only logical and quite reasonable to understand that the Pope and with him
the church strive for an amount of control over the community for which they are
responsible. It is also comprehensible that the Coptic laity will be put under pressure,
whether by himself and his own conscience, or from amongst the community or from
the church itself, to submit to the church‘s rules, as it is the one entity that does
provide for them. From this position of the church, as well as in connection to the
sectarian tensions, derive the accusations of being traitors against those laity members,
who will go against the ‗father of the flock‘ that knows what is best for them, to
pursue their own desires and agendas, such as obtaining a divorce for other reasons
than adultery. It is at this point that the two institutions that understand themselves to
be responsible for the citizens would necessarily clash with each other at some point.

4.1 National Unity
With regards to divorce and remarriage, the question of who is the ‗true‘
representative of the Coptic citizens, or rather whose judgment is valid and needs to
be followed, remains especially in light of the fact that the Coptic Church seems to be
the provider for the Copts even though they are nationals of the state of Egypt. It is
only natural that clashes will occur in the event of two contradicting judgments and it
is even more obvious that the Coptic citizen will be torn not only between his or her
various agendas and desires but also his or her two loyalties.
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It is my belief, that the question of national unity is important for the discourse
on Coptic divorce, especially when researched through the lens of citizenship. If
Egypt achieved true national unity, that is a centralized government and equal rights
and responsibilities for all its citizens, regardless of their religion with the state as
their only and true representative, than many, if not to say most or all, of the issues
and problematics of Coptic divorce in Egypt would be rendered of their validity and
of their impact. Thus, there would be no choice for the Coptic citizen between the
freedom of practicing one‘s religion and equality before the law, which today‘s
discourse and the nationalization of the courts in 1956 have made it a reality in every
Copt‘s life who is looking to divorce and remarry.
The duality of church and state as the two representatives of the Copts, and
which are thus the entities the Coptic citizen has to turn to when he is looking to
divorce, has been established and nourished since the era of President Nasser,
particularly since his abolition of the religious personal status courts. Mariz Tadros
illustrates in her article about the history of the state‘s relationship with the Coptic
Church that through Nasser‘s abolition of the milli courts, Nasser supported the Coptic
Church in its struggle with the Majlis al-Milli over power and control over the Coptic
laity.186 It is my contention that only through this move did Nasser give the church the
sole authority over the personal affairs of the Coptic citizens and over the Coptic PSL.
The power struggle of today over these laws between government and church stem
largely from this abolition, as the Coptic laity previously had considerably more
influence over their own private affairs and these laws. Furthermore, Nasser‘s
authoritarian regime ―inhibited virtually all forms of civic life, including Coptic civic
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engagement, whether with respect to church reform or to national politics.‖187
Through political and civil isolation, the church started to become the only
representative of the Coptic community, resulting quite logically in the Copts
identification with their religion more than with their citizenship and the church‘s
hegemony over their laity‘s personal and family matters and choices.
Tadros describes the relationship between the government and the Coptic
Church as an entente, an agreement between the two entities. The regime granted the
church leadership of their community, and the church in turn granted the state political
support and propagation of the government among the laity.188 While the good
relationship between President Nasser and Pope Kyrillos VI has certainly had a
positive effect on this kind of contract, the relationship between their successors
President Sadat and Pope Shenouda began to be strained. This deterioration is largely
attributed to two main factors, the Islamization of politics and civil society, which
occurred under President Sadat and was largely encouraged by him, the ―‘believer
president‘‖189 and Pope Shenouda‘s political activity in reaction to this course of
religious awakening.190
The Coptic Pope and the Egyptian president were highly at odds with each
other. Pope Shenouda attacked President Sadat openly in his speeches and at public
appearances for his religiously influenced regime and for making Islam the new
nationalism, in response for example to the amendment of Article 2 of the constitution
in 1980, naming the Islamic shari‘a the instead of a source of legislation.191 The latter
was deeply provoked by the Pope‘s political activity, a provocation, which culminated
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in Sadat‘s termination of the 1971 presidential decree that had selected Shenouda and
the banishment and house arrest of the Coptic Pope to a convent in Wadi al-Natrun.192
Pope Shenouda‘s political activity, as well as the tightening of the divorce
laws in the 1970s for Copts as we have seen, was more a response to the ever-rising
threat of Islamization and sectarian tensions than anything else. It is a natural
consequence when the state gives another entity, such as the church, power and
leadership over a part of the national community, that the church will take over the
responsibility and protection of this community, especially when the state itself fails
to do so. However, the breakdown resulted through the provocation and
disappointment of both leaders in each other. While Pope Shenouda was threatened by
Sadat‘s policies, Sadat probably assumed he would receive the Pope‘s support of his
policies in exchange for granting him leadership and control over the Coptic
community, just as his predecessor had.
Today‘s relationship between the Egyptian government under Hosni Mubarak
and the Coptic Church under Pope Shenouda is largely coined by a continuance of the
above-described entente, but this reciprocal relationship is not free of clashes between
the two entities. The ambivalence of the state towards the church‘s hegemony over the
Coptic laity shines through especially in cases of divorce. This has been illustrated
through cases in the years of 2006 and 2008, where the Supreme Administrative Court
tried to ‗force‘ the Coptic Church to grant divorcees the permit to remarry, even if the
divorce had not been recognized in Coptic canon law. Here it seems the government
cannot decide which stance, civil or religious, it should take.
Yet as we have seen, the Coptic Church as well does not seem to be certain of
what it deems best for its control in regards to personal status matters. Needless to say,
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the relationship between the two actors improved immensely at first when President
Mubarak ended the Pope‘s house arrest in 1985. Consequently, Shenouda returned to
a non-confrontational stance with the government, granting it political support in
exchange for his leadership.193 But ever since the 2004 conversion of a Coptic priest‘s
wife, Wafaa Constantine, to Islam, the entente between church and state has become
rather strained again.194 Many intellectuals, such as Tariq al-Bishry have used this
case to demonstrate the Coptic Church as a state within the Egyptian state as it took
on powers and responsibilities towards Constantine only the state should practice as
the civil representative of the citizen.
Thus, where should the authority of the church be limited and actually end and
where does the authority and responsibilities of the state begin, especially when the
PSL of Egypt are supposed to be religious and thus divorces and remarriages have to
be recognized by religious institutions? Even though there are many disagreements on
this issue, both the church and the state agree on the fact that national unity is of
utmost importance. They both also agree on the fact that sectarian tensions and
violence are one of the greatest dangers to this unity, and thus must be condemned and
prevented although both entities surely have their own agendas and reasons for
propagating such a concept and the dangers of sectarian violence.
The state for its part is denying such violence in order not to lose the little
legitimacy and control it still has. Acknowledging the reality of sectarian tensions
would be equal to admitting to loss of control and loss of ‗national unity‘, which then
would delegitimize the government in place. But its main aim is to stay in place, and
thus it will not acknowledge the fact that these incidents are indeed sectarian and not
individual acts of crime. The Coptic Church, on the other hand, is naturally afraid of
193
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sectarian tensions and violence, to which Copts are falling victims. Pope Shenouda
spoke in an al-Ahram Weekly interview of the importance of national unity and
policies that foster as such: ―I would like to emphasise (sic!) the importance of
interaction among Christians and Muslims in all areas, not just on the political level,
but on all levels... Even as children, they must play together.‖195
National unity thus cannot just be understood on a bureaucratic and political
level, but societal and cultural as well. It becomes a concept here that incorporates
tolerance and peaceful coexistence of the different communities, which live in and
make up the society. As a consequence to such an understanding or definition of
national unity, sectarian violence and tensions are thus a great danger to it. Ever since
the beginning of the twenty-first century, a rise in sectarian tensions and incidents has
been observed in Egypt to the extent that these incidents have become an almost
regular occurrence in today‘s papers and newsreels. The government has attributed
such attacks and violence to individual perpetrators as well as traditions of country
life, rather than sectarian backgrounds. The ―Speaker of the (People‘s) Assembly
Fathi Sorour said the attack (of Nag Hammadi, which happened on Orthodox
Christmas Eve 2010) ‗not only wounded the Coptic community but all of Egypt. Let
me stress (…) that this was an individual criminal act, like a clash between two
brothers living in one home‘.‖196
While the Egyptian government continued on its official discourse here, which
includes denying sectarian violence as not to lose its legitimacy and spread further
panic and resentment, even though one might wonder if this approach does not
actually increase such feelings, at least of the Coptic community against the state,
Coptic officials as well as human rights groups and intellectuals have held against this
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attitude in the public discourse. For example, Amr Hamzawy, the senior associate at
the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, accuses the government of not
acknowledging the fact, and not even worrying about the rise of sectarian tensions and
violence between Muslims and Copts in Egypt. ―(…) on occasion it parades Muslim
and Christian clerics together, to show us that everything is under control. Often such
shows of religious coexistence are mounted right after a horrendous sectarian attack
has been committed.‖197
But instead of placing the blame only on the government, the media as well as
the citizenry of Egypt and its way of treating each other solely based on their religion
find mentioning in his article as well. In Hamzawy‘s opinion ―an indecisive state, an
incendiary media, and a failure of civil institutions to stand up for the equal rights of
all. Under such circumstances, sectarian violence finds justification and religious
hatred finds a cause.‖198 From this violence, it becomes simple to trace the Copts‘
isolation and feelings of being threatened in Egypt. The church naturally responds to
such risks by not only tightening its control over the laity in general, but over their
private lives and affairs in particular, partly because it is allowed to do as such, as the
Coptic PSL are based on Coptic canon law and partly because the Coptic family‘s
disruption through divorce would weaken the community and isolate its members
even further.
Sameh Fawzy analyzes sectarian tensions according to citizenship issues and
problems in Egypt. He writes that some ―support a different agenda (instead of
integrating Copts) and would like Copts to remain marginalized (sic!), culturally and
politically, for the sake of their political project. In sum, not all who speak about
national unity have an interest in Coptic integration in society. But if we want to
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sustain citizenship rights for all, representation for all must be achieved.‖ 199 One
might wonder here, who Fawzy is actually talking about, the church or the
government or maybe both. The Egyptian government has reason to prefer the status
quo rather than the true integration of the Coptic citizen, as it does not have to deal
with the individual Coptic citizen and his problems and demands, but rather can refer
to the religious institution, which will then regulate and control this part of the
Egyptian community.
It is not my intention here to insinuate that the Coptic Church is content with
the status quo, but one has to keep in mind that full political and social integration will
be only achieved by the loss of the church‘s political power as the Coptic
representative in front of the state as well as its justification for making divorces
virtually impossible, as these strict laws are traced back to the rise of sectarian
violence and isolation of the Copts. However, under the treat and danger of sectarian
tensions, it is only a natural reaction of the church to try and protect its laity, whether
it is its political representative or not. The Coptic Church‘s rigidity and strictness, as
well as its gripping unto the control of the Coptic family, has thus to be understood
and viewed under these circumstances. This is not intended to be an apologetic
discourse on the church‘s rigidity, but in order to comprehend and judge on such
attitudes, it is of utmost importance to take the full picture and all its components, be
they religious, legal or political into account. Here sectarian tensions do play a role in
the discourse on Coptic divorce and the developments of these laws and the church‘s
attitude as we have seen in previous chapters and illustrations.
The one on the losing end here is indeed the Coptic citizen, whether in
political or personal affairs, such as divorce or remarriage. While his representative,
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the church, gives him a sense of security and authenticity and thus he naturally feels a
certain connection and loyalty towards it, at the same time it restricts his life choices
in a way, that the state does not. Thus, in search of his own benefits and desires, he
will necessarily be torn between these two entities, which in the end both claim
responsibility and representation of him, the state on the national level and the church
on the religious, as well as social and cultural level.
This necessary diremption of the Coptic citizen is again not only proof of
Egypt‘s in-between status of civil and religious state, as such a feeling would not
come up in either, as well as the political and social make-up of Egypt, which has
resulted in two states within one: the government itself on the one side and the Coptic
Church on the other. To this status, sectarian tensions as well as the political make-up
of Egypt and the church-state relationship are all contributing factors, which result in
the occurence of divorce and remarriage in many cases, in two different valid
judgments between which the Coptic citizen has to choose again and through which
the diremption is not only renewed but further established, deepened and proven to be
existent in the most personal affairs of the Coptic citizen.

4.2 Two States in Egypt
It has been illustrated that Copts feel more connected to the church than to the
Egyptian state since the latter has not provided them with adequate security. Another
consequence to the surge in tensions and violence amongst the Egyptians has been a
proportional increase in the rigidity, strictness and conservatism of the Coptic Church,
especially in regards to personal and family affairs, as the family is understood as the
basis of the community and thus has to be preserved and protected. Hence, Pope
Shenouda conceded that the rising religious conservatism in Egypt, resulted in Copts‘
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feelings of un-acceptance in society and thus, they turn to their religion as well. When
asked what brought this change about, the Pope acknowledged, ―the general
atmosphere is different now. (…) (And that a) general atmosphere (is needed) in
which the other is accepted.‖200 Tariq al-Bishry takes this whole argument a step
further by citing Milad Hanna, who reasons that not only Copts have been oppressed
in Egypt, but Muslims as well, thus their oppression is connected to the oppression of
all Egyptians.201 Improvement can only be achieved through implementing the main
points of citizenship, in al-Bishry‘s opinion, which are participation and equality.202 It
shines through in his writing and reasoning that the author believes that the
implementation of the Islamic shari‘a would lead to a realization of these values for
all of Egypt‘s citizens, as damming Islam has never guaranteed the church safety. It
has always preserved itself, be it in the threat of Western influences and forces or by
sectarian violence in Egypt.203
While one can certainly agree with the author‘s first line of reasoning, the way
on how to implement these values is certainly disputable. It is highly doubtful, that
implementing the Islamic shari‘a in its fullest would lead to political and social
equality between Christians and Muslims and thus, Coptic laity and clergy alike worry
about and oppose such an idea strongly, as we have seen. But as it has also been
illustrated, an Islamic state would give the Coptic community, or rather the Coptic
Church, unlimited freedom and hegemony over the Coptic PSL. Herein lies the basis
of the church‘s double standards in the discourse on divorce and remarriage and the
choice the Coptic community faces as a consequence – Islamic or civil state. As it is,
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the debate on divorce combined with the fact that the church is able to practice
hegemonie power over its laity, proves once more Egypt‘s ambiguous status between
civil and religious and that the church has become, through its status of
‗representative‘ and ‗spokesman‘ a state within the Egyptian state.
Sameh Fawzy addresses this dynamic between the government and the church.
In an article he wrote for Daily News Egypt, he examines this, reasoning that Pope
Shenouda becoming the spokesman of the Copts is connected to the lack of legitimacy
of the Egyptian government, while he acknowledges the entente Tadros examines:
―As far as the state is concerned, Pope Shenouda has become the only representative
of the Coptic community. If a Copt has a problem, he has to turn to the church,
simply because the government does that when it wants Christian support for the
ruling National Democratic Party in public elections.‖204 It is interesting to note here
though that if a Copt has a problem concerning his family or marriage, he inevitably
turns to the government instead of the church, for help. In this case, the state is the one
that is willing to work with and help the citizen. In regards to family and personal
matters, it is thus the other way around and the exact opposite to every other possible
situation, which might urge the Copt to turn to his representative for help. And this is
even though the PSL are the only thing in the Egyptian constitution that are supposed
to be based on religion.
Fawzy implies political activity of the church in regards to national politics as
he connects the government‘s acknowledgement of the Pope‘s power and legitimacy
as the ‗leader of the Copts‘ when it needs ‗Coptic support‘ in elections. But Pope
Shenouda himself distinguishes between political and civic activity, describing
himself as only active in the latter as he, or rather that the ―church is not involved in
204
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politics. (…) It has other responsibilities. But, at the same time, it has a national and
civic duty.‖205 This national and civic duty is propagated and acknowledged not only
by the Egyptian government at least at times, but also by the concept of power sharing
that is predominant in Egypt‘s internal politics.
Thus, Egypt could be described as a pluralistic state, where power sharing is
applied, especially in regards to Coptic PSL and citizenship. In a pluralistic state,
―Internal peace is based on mutual respect, a general sense loyalty toward established
procedures and rules of conduct, as well as a shared interest in protecting the political
architecture of the system.‖206 A couple of obvious consequences result from this
concept and the approach to Coptic citizenship, as it is in an indirect relationship
between citizen and state, while the citizen is at first and foremost connected with his
religious institution, which then mediates between citizen and state. First and
foremost, ―Christians have practically become citizens in church rather than a
state.‖207 This outcome is partially connected to the concept of power-sharing as well
as the fact, that the church has provided duties and concepts, the government has
either been unwilling or unable to make available to the Coptic community of Egypt.
The most important one of those is the guaranteeing of what McCallum calls
‗human security‘, which is a ―key achievement of the state (…) (and which
contributes to the) general correlation between the removal of immediate risks and the
decline of religiosity.‖208 Another is the providing of an authentic identity, which
became especially important in the case of Egypt at the rise of Islamization under
President Sadat. It is a natural result that a religious minority would cling to its own
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heritage and religious identity when feeling threatened inter-communally and
politically by the majority. Only then could the church as a religious institution gain
more influence over people‘s lives again, as the state could or would simply not
provide for them while the church did everything in its powers to counter the state.
This lack of action by the government, as well the concept of power-sharing and the
entente, which has been kept alive between the church and the state, all contribute to
the weakening of the state in its centrality and the strengthening of the Coptic Church,
as not only the representative of the Copts and in maintaining the control over Copts‘
family and personal affairs, but as a state-like entity in Egypt.
This reality, which is a combination of the church‘s self-understanding as well
as propagation and recognition by the government, becomes extremely important in
regards to the struggles over PSL, including the drafting, application and control over
those, as well as divorce and remarriage of Copts. As the PSL are still derived from
religious sources in Egypt and are thus contributing to its dual legalism, it is a
reasonable result that the Coptic Church understands itself as having the first and
foremost control over these laws and issues as well as the last say in regards to
divorce and remarriage of member of their community. The conflict between the
church and the state starts right here, at this point. While superficially, the debate
seems to be about divorce and remarriage, it is my belief that these discourses and
conflicts are actually about control over the Coptic laity and their personal affairs. The
Pope has here only the right to ask for such a control, unlike for example the Mufti on
Muslim‘s private lives, because he is recognized by the state as the Copts‘ spokesman
and representative in every other affair and area, while the government itself and not a
religious institution, such as al-Azhar, which as well is under the Egyptian state,
represents the Muslim citizenry. The church is hence demanding the control over the
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one thing that is still considered religious in Egypt‘s legal affairs and constitution, and
at the same time this is the one area where the state does interfere with court rulings,
such as ordering the church to let divorcees remarry.
The crux of the whole matter is here the issuing of two different judgments.
While the state grants the divorce and thus a permit for remarriage, it does not have
the authority to grant the latter. This authority lies strictly with the church and while
the state may grant the divorce of a Copt, as it rules this on the basis of the 1938
decree as we have seen, the church might not recognize this divorce as valid and
according to its dogma, and thus does not grant the remarriage permit, which it is
allowed to do. Karimah Kamal focuses on this point - the two contradicting rulings of
the two forces, church and the state – and asks one of her interviewees, Dr. Samir
Tanaghu, a doctor of civil law at Alexandria University, whose judgment should
prevail in such a case of contradiction. In his opinion, there should be no conflict as
the will of the state does prevail in questions of law. The state is the entity that applies
these laws, even though they might have a religious basis and thus, while the state
gave the church authority to draft laws, it has no authority of legislation.209
While Tanaghu acknowledges the Copts‘ dilemma in this situation, as their
loyalty has to be divided on this point, he at the same time dismisses it, as he
concludes that there is no true struggle over the control and power over the PSL in
Egypt, as the church understands that its competence is authorized and granted by the
state210 and thus, when one takes this a step further, can be taken away by it again.
Whereas in theory his conclusions and arguments might be logical and true, it is very
different in regards to reality and practice. The struggle between the church and the
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Egyptian government over the influence and control over the Coptic PSL and out of
these derived judgments and rulings becomes obvious in court rulings, such as the one
in 2006, which has been examined in a previous chapter, ordering the church to allow
divorcees to marry again and the clergy‘s as well as the laity‘s divided reactions to
these decisions. Such a court ruling has been understood as an interference by the
state, where it should have no say. This viewpoint is partially understandable, as the
government backs the church as the legitimate representative of the Copts on the one
hand, and on the other hand because the PSL in Egypt are supposed to be religious
and thus the state cannot meddle with these, as the Coptic Church is naturally the
religious authority over Coptic Christianity and its laity.
While the church‘s double standards in the debate on Coptic divorces and a
civil state were highly obvious, the state‘s double standards shine through right here.
It cannot support and recognize the Coptic Church, and more specifically the Coptic
Pope, as the spokesman for the Coptic community and then take away his authority
over the one area, the PSL, which is supposed to be based on religion in the Egyptian
state. Neither the church nor the state are willing to step down from its position of
authority and influence over the Coptic community, which results not only in the
disruption of the Coptic community in general, and more specifically of those
members who try to obtain a divorce, but also in the construction and reality of the
Coptic Church as a state within the Egyptian state.
The question of remarriage becomes central and especially important to prove
the church‘s state-like qualities, as only through the issuing of this permit does the
implication of the Coptic Church being a state become explicit and obvious. Since the
state is the entity, which issues and grants the divorce, even though the church might
not recognize it, the Copts in question are legally divorced until it comes to the
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question of remarriage. Only then does the power of the church play the role, which
proves its state-like qualities. As the Coptic Church does not recognize the divorce, it
will not grant a remarriage and thus will not issue the permit a divorcee needs to
remarry in church again. Here, two contradicting judgments of the exact same case are
issued and only here does the power, influence and authority of the church actually
imply consequences for the Coptic divorcee and for the government as well. While the
Coptic divorcee(s) is hindered from continuing on with life in a ‗normal‘ fashion, the
state is exceptionally weakened by the church‘s position and authority, which cannot
be taken away as 2006 or 2008 has shown.
Tanaghu, Kamal‘s interviewee, acknowledges this point as well. While he is of
the opinion that the church should recognize these rulings, he also concedes that
nobody can force it to do so and consequently to issue a re-marriage permit.211 Bishop
Pola, the head of the ecclesiastical council, which is the authority in the Coptic
Church over family affairs, voices his thoughts on the matter very clearly: ―If
someone gets a divorce order from the court and he or she wants to marry in the
Coptic Church, then they should marry according to the Coptic Church‘s rule (…).
How can we take orders to do something against the Holy Book? I don‘t blame the
judge; he is a judge with a Muslim mentality who is ruling Coptic affairs, which he
knows nothing about.‖212
However, the Egyptian public as we have seen is divided on this matter and
has not been afraid to speak up in this issue. It seems that many implicitly recognize
the fact that the church has indeed established itself as a state within the state and that
it is the government‘s duty now, to counteract those developments. There is no
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acknowledgment though that the government has undeniably fostered these
developments. Hossam Bahgat, the director of the human rights organization The
Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights (EIPR) is one example of those who do call on
the Egyptian state to intervene: ―The Coptic Orthodox Church is entitled to its
interpretation of religious texts, but the state has the right -- indeed, the duty-- to
provide an alternative to those Copts who disagree with the interpretation.‖213
Karimah Kamal recognizes the power struggles behind the divorce debate as well,
summing these struggles up in a very insightful way: ―We are faced with two major
challenges: the church and the state. Let me start with the state. Far from being
secular, the state increasingly poses as being religious. It is against this backdrop that
the church is adopting an evermore-defensive posture. It is very difficult for Copts to
oppose the church and in the current climate to openly oppose the church is seen as
little short of treachery.‖214
It is this recognition that Kamal develops in her own study on Coptic divorce,
where she subscribes the church‘s feeling of being responsible and able to be a
mediator in Coptic family affairs, to the past. And it is with this background, that she
questions this power today, asking why the church will not realize that a civil power,
the state, is today stronger and more able to be in such a position, than it is.215 This
point that she makes here, is highly disputable as the government does recognize the
church, as the Coptic representative in every possible way, be it explicitly or
implicitly by not responding to this community‘s civil and political needs. One could
argue here, that the government neither does so for its Muslim community and thus,
the Copts should not feel discriminated or oppressed. However this is not the point the
213
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chapter is trying to make. Rather it proves that these conditions helped the church to
become an entity with at least state-like qualities, which thus strives for explicit and
absolute control over its laity‘s private legal affairs.
Yet, as a state apparatus for regulating these affairs already exists, the struggle
between church and state becomes inevitable, especially when issuing the re-marriage
permit is the only control the Coptic Church has left over the Copts‘ family and
personal status affairs and laws after the abolition of the religious courts under Nasser
in 1956.216 Thus, it is not only sectarian tensions, which urge the Coptic Church to
hold rigidly unto this authority, but letting go of this authority would mean a total loss
of control over the Coptic community, which as its base has the Coptic family. While
this is truly a coherent concept, in regards to power relations as well as to the genuine
feeling of being threatened by one‘s fellow citizens and bureaucracy, one can on the
other hand quite easily understand Kamal‘s frustration, when she describes the Copts‘
striving and need for their church‘s blessing on their life choices and the church‘s
refusal to give it to them.217

4.3 Concluding Remarks
One could argue that while Kamal‘s dissatisfaction is certainly understandable, the
Coptic Church does not act in strictness and rigidity, but rather reacts towards the
state, which on the one hand officially recognizes its authority in ‗leadership‘ of the
Coptic community but on the other hand criticizes and refuses to help the church,
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which adds to its feelings and perceptions of being attacked and threatened by
sectarian violence.
This perceived threat along with the above mentioned position of
representative of the Coptic community gives the church the logical consequential
feelings of responsibility and authority over Coptic affairs, be they religious, political
or legal interference of the state is thus perceived as a threat to the authenticity of the
Coptic community, and moreover to the church‘s control over it. This whole conflict‘s
basis lies in the fact that the government usually accepts and recognizes the role of the
church, or the Pope, as the civil representative of the Coptic community, as long as
this representative does not threaten the state‘s unity.218 It is highly doubtful though in
my opinion, that the state can actually be unified, if there are two civil representatives.
Egypt‘s case indeed proves that the experiment has backfired quite logically, as the
church, pope or the Coptic community as a whole stands in the threat of being called
and accused of disloyalty towards the state.219
Through such an understanding of citizenship, where one community is
directly connected to a religious institution as a mediator or link between them and the
state, it is only logical that these religious institutions become political. In Egypt‘s
case, the church has especially grown in importance and centrality in Copts‘ lives, due
to the rise of sectarian tensions, violence and Islamic fundamentalism. A civil leader,
such as Pope Shenouda here, sooner or later necessarily needs to become politically
active, as the government neglects then all its duties and relationships it has towards
the Coptic community. One has to also remember that ―any religious leader who
becomes involved in political affairs has to walk a tightrope in order to satisfy the
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demands of a community without causing strife either internally or with the
authorities or wider society.‖220
It is highly probable that Pope Shenouda is very aware of this fact, as well as
his responsibilities towards his community. But one should also not forget that the
Copts are not supposed to be citizens of the church, as Sameh Fawzy has called it, but
citizens of the Egyptian state. Thus, the entity of the state does have responsibilities
towards its citizens, be they Muslim or Christian. This is where the conflict in the
question of the remarriage license appears. Divorce and remarriage are thus not just
that, private family issues that need to be discussed and handled on a legal platform,
but they become an arena of negotiation of citizenship as well as control.
The church refuses to issue the permit of remarriage, even though the state has
granted the divorce, which the church thus does not recognize as being valid. The
church, instead of granting these lay members what they want, answers in strictness,
because of the danger and challenge of sectarian violence and its threats towards the
community, which basis, the family, has to be protected at all costs, as well as to
prevent the loss of control over this community and the aforementioned basis. The
state does not help in the matter; it lacks in legitimacy in the Copts‘ eyes and cannot
go far enough against the church, as the state itself granted this control. The Coptic
citizen is in the middle, where the two forces negotiate the further continuance of his
personal life. Real citizenship cannot be granted here, because either force stops the
granting of it short as they negotiate on it in the arena of divorce and remarriage, two
things that should only concern the citizen in the end.
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Both the state and the church, and their double standards use the rhetoric of
equality and citizenship and their quest to reach these goals. But through examining
the dynamics of the discourse on divorce, as well as the concept of citizenship in
Egypt and the church‘s relationship with the state, it becomes obvious that while the
discourse might be partly about divorce and remarriage as these are in Egypt religious
issues as well, the debate and struggles are much more about the control of these
issues. Thus, the conflict between husband and wife has detoriated and instead has
become a conflict between the two entities, with the Coptic citizens in the middle,
being pulled in different directions of his state and his church.
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5. CONCLUSION
After all these illustrations and examinations of different aspects of Coptic
divorces in Egypt, the question arises of what does actually remain. Indeed, the more
one thinks about and delves into this topic and its different aspects and point of views,
the more deeper and complicated it becomes. The struggles and debates on Coptic
divorce in Egypt are not just legal in nature, but do have other components and
include other aspects and levels as well. The discourse is as much a legal as it is a
religious one, as the PSL in Egypt are supposed to be based on and applied according
to one‘s religion, as stated in Law 462 of 1956.
This law is the basis of not only Egypt‘s legal dualism in regards to PSL but
also to Egypt‘s ambivalent status between a civil and an Islamic state. Egypt‘s odd
position is the basis of the church‘s control and power not only over the Coptic PSL
and their private affairs, but also over the laity as a whole as its political, civil and
religious representative. Through these power relations between the Egyptian state
and the Coptic Church, the Coptic divorce debate takes on a political nature, the
moment the will and decisions of the church on these laws and judgments in these
cases clashes with those of the state. The discourse on Coptic divorce in Egypt does
thus not only have a legal level, but a religious and a political one as well.
These other notions are connected to the fact that the divorce of Copts
becomes an arena, in which power struggles are fought out. These struggles are inside
the church itself, as well as between church and laity, the laity and the state and last
but certainly not least, the state and the church – the two main political actors in this
scene. The Coptic citizen is here the one that is put in the middle and the one who has
to choose between two major citizenship rights – the freedom of practicing religion
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freely and the basic right of equality before the law. This choice only truly came about
through Nasser‘s nationalization and unification of the courts in 1956, where the
laity‘s influence over personal status laws and courts then completely diminished. In
these multilayered power struggles and discourses, it is needles to say that each side
has their, though not homogenous, own agenda, intentions and motivations for their
attitude and each of those become understandable and logical when examined in their
own point of view.
Damming Sectarianism
Thus, a solution to the controversies of Coptic divorce, such as two valid
contradicting judgments in the question of a divorcee‘s remarriage or the citizen‘s
choice between two basic rights, becomes difficult to find, and it seems impossible to
find a solution to these controversies and choices of the Coptic citizens‘ lives, with
which every side will be content. Even though it is my opinion that the two entities,
state as well as church, should actually strive to help and support their citizens or laity
and not act out of desire for power and maintaining control, one certain way and big
step to open up the discussion on citizenship as well as divorce and divorce laws
again, would be in condemming sectarian violence and tensions and truly working
towards unity and tolerance.
As the government is responsible for the citizens‘ security, it is this institution
that needs to pick up its slack here and seriously start working towards policies that
promote as such. The current approach and attitude that is adapted by the government,
which includes the denial of sectarian violence and dealing with these incidents
through the church, weakens the state in its centrality and legitimacy, while
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simultaneously strengthening the church, and keeps it from addressing a true and
vibrant problem in Egyptian society.
It is also not useful to cite and remember history as proof of Egyptians‘
coexistence and tolerance towards each other.221 Such an approach revives nothing but
nostalgia and mystification of the past, which does not attribute to solving the
problems of the present. Ammar Ali Hassan, the director of Centre for Middle Eastern
Studies and Research, names in his Al-Ahram Weekly piece secularism as essential to
securing the (Coptic) citizens‘ rights. ―It is also essential to separate religion from
politics. The church should not attempt to play a political role, and Islamic
organisations (sic!) and groups should not continue to politicize (sic!) religion.‖222
Rather than propagating through its own policies willingly or unwillingly, the
polarization of religion and their institutions, the state should enlist these institutions
in propagating unity and tolerance. However, as it is of now, to both the church and
the state, the maintenance of the control they do still have seems to be more important
than actually improving the citizens‘ situation of living. Emad Gad, the secretary
general of the Arabs Against Discrimination, that the ―current regime hasn‘t made any
effort to eliminate sectarian tension (and that) there were many opportunities for the
Church and the regime to start a dialogue addressing Coptic concerns, but that both
parties did not pursue such a dialogue as if they were happy with the status quo.‖223
But such a dialogue and cooperation would truly help in fostering tolerance and unity
among the Egyptians and thus open up to debates, be they on citizenship or divorce. It
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would diminish the isolation of an essential part of Egypt‘s citizenry, but both the
state and the church would have to work together to achieve this aim.
However, it is questionable after illustrating the struggles on PSL and Coptic
divorce between these two entities that such an cooperation would benefit and
contribute to the aims of each institution, which both come down to the control over
the PSL and these cases, each of course having its own agenda and motivation for
maintaining this control. While the state aims here for greater centrality and influence
over the part of the Egyptian population it has essentially lost, the church acts on the
accord that these laws are based on religion and thus cannot be meddled with by the
state and that the family is the basic unit of the community and thus must not be
threatened in order for the community to survive. Here these threats culminate in the
sectarian violence and tensions, which have seen a revival since the 1970s under
President Sadat and his relationship to Pope Shenouda.
To eliminate such a feeling of being threatened and its result of religious
rigidity and conservatism, the ―Egyptian government must eliminate all factors that
threaten the idea of co-existence and end all discrimination on the basis of religion,
(…). It must be courageous in dealing with misinterpreted religious teachings that fuel
religious extremism.‖224 While the Coptic citizen here is certainly the victim of these
discriminations and tensions, it is my opinion that he / she too needs to cooperate with
the state on these policies and endeavors. The Copts as well need to take part in these
projects and work against their isolation and the limiting of their choices in private
affairs, both from church and the state. But still, as the Copts are the numerical
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minority in Egypt, it is my belief that the Muslim majority has to take the first step in
realizing these aims.
Amr Hamzawy insists on the need of the Muslim majority to begin the Coptic
community‘s re-integration in the Egyptian society, making a strong case for civil
society to take action; ―(…) the Muslims need to revive the country's old tradition of
enlightened civil and religious rights. The Muslims need to encourage civil society,
educational organisations (sic!) and the media to stay on track. What we have now is a
societal environment in which sectarian exclusion and tensions have become the
norm. Unless we want the Copts to live in fear or leave the country, we need to
change things.‖225 These things, which he talks about, include the approaches of the
media, the government and the religious institutions as well as of the citizens
themselves. He accuses the Egyptian citizenry of a ―deplorable tendency, across the
sectarian divide, to place religious affiliation above the bonds of citizenry. It is
through this narrow perspective that people regard others, whether Muslims or
Christians, in an exclusivist manner. (…) It is this phenomenon that empties civil
citizenry of all meaning.‖226
Undoubtedly to change such attitudes across the country, major reforms of
education, the media as well as in government and church circles are needed and these
reforms and changes are certainly not achieved and realized easily. Nevertheless, they
are of greatest importance to curb and prevent sectarian tensions and violence,
prejudices and intolerance, to grant equal citizenship rights to all and to open up the
debates on religious PSL and the rights of Copts in comparison to Muslims. Sectarian
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violence plays a significant role in the debate of Coptic divorce and remarriage and
the church‘s attitude. Thus it becomes of utmost importance to curb such tensions in
order for the church‘s ability to open up on this subject.
Civil or Islamic State?
It is clear that Coptic divorces and the debates and discourses on them become
a power struggle, and not as one would expect between the two affected spouses but
between two entities, the church and the state and the Coptic citizen, who is striving to
divorce, is put in the middle. While according to the Coptic Church, it refuses to
loosen its attitude on the matter because of the religiosity of the PSL and because of
what Coptic Christianity mentions of divorce, it becomes clear that the matter is not
only about religion but also about maintaining the control over this particular law.
While the church and the state, both conceptualize their stance and outlook on this
matter, as on every other, through rhetorics of citizenship, equality and religion, these
rhetorics cannot be taken at face value, as this thesis has shown. They are utilized to
mystify and as a result complicate the matter of divorce and remarriage that is for the
affected parties already complicated and difficult enough.
In regards to citizenship, either force, the state or the church through their own
agendas and motivations, albeit unwillingly, limits it. Either the state grants the
divorce and remarriage of the Coptic citizen, which then would not be compatible
with the fact that each religious denomination should have their own code of PSL and
be judged according to them (a system which can only be found in an Islamic state,
based on ‗Islamic tolerance‘ and the dhimmi contract), or the church limits the Coptic
citizen‘s right of equality before the law by its refusal to grant the remarriage permit
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to the Coptic divorcee, which is the church‘s full right in Egypt‘s ambivalent status
between civil and religious state.
Thus, the government cannot force the church to issue these permits as long as
it remains an in-between Islamic and civil state. It cannot call itself civil and maintain
two sets of PSL and then forcing the church to partly give these codes and the control
over them up. Here lie the double standards of the church‘s stance as well. While it
condemns an Islamic state and urges the civil state of Egypt to aid the Copts in the
case of sectarian tensions, a civil state would not grant the Coptic Church an own PSL
code and control over it. Here the church seems to be quite content with the fact, that
the state of Egypt has Islamic nuances as well. In consequence, neither church nor
state can truly decide what it wants Egypt to become and thus, the nation will have to
remain in the middle of the two governmental forms. Thus, citizenship is here limited
by either force, church as well as state, through their own agendas and motivations
and the Coptic citizen who already lost the marriage, be that in the church‘s eyes or
not, is the true loser in this tug-of-war because he will ultimately lose rights that
should be granted to everyone. Adding to that is the fact that these rights are taken
away from him by institutions that allegedly demand these rights and which should
strive to support and protect the citizen of violations made against him or his rights.
In spite of these double standards, I do not intent to insinuate here or in the
thesis as a whole that every clergyman acts out of this accord. I do believe that the
church knows well of its responsibility towards its laity and does its best to stand up to
those. It is only a natural consequence that it would expect from its laity loyalty in
return, which it mostly gets as well. It is indeed problematic that the church coins the
ones that go against it and its policies traitors and as being against the Coptic faith,
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church and community, when obtaining a divorce for example that goes against the
rules and dogmas of the Coptic faith. But this rhetoric will neither subside nor vanish
until the Coptic Church deems its laity safe in Egypt. It is in this context, that the
position of the church needs to be analyzed and understood. ―Talk of modernizing the
church (…) (leads to) discussions about sectarian strife.‖227 Until the reining in of
sectarian tensions and violence, it will not be possible for the church to change its
position on the matter of divorce. These incidents propagate the fear about the
existence and survival of the Coptic community too much to loosen up the laws of
dissolving marriages and families. However, it is naturally questionable if a
community, in which the families are held together by force has a better chance of
survival as one where its member live in happy marriages, and thus build a healthy
basis for the community as a whole.
Yet despite all of these contemplations, much would be done in the case of
Coptic divorce, as well as citizenship issues overall, through going against
sectarianism and propagating unity and tolerance. When analyzing the power
struggles of church and state, it would actually be more beneficial to the state than the
church to curb these tensions, as it would provide more legitimacy and centrality,
while it would weaken the church‘s position and control if the Coptic community
were truly integrated in society. Thus, it becomes rather incomprehensible why the
Egyptian government resumes the position it has taken on these matters, instead of
changing its approach and cooperating with the church on these matters. Such a
change of attitude would certainly demonstrate goodwill and thus might open the
church up to reconsider its attitude towards Coptic divorces as well, which would be
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beneficial both to the state as well as the Coptic citizen, who is in the end the most
affected party of the three.
Solutions?
But until these changes occur, maybe the solution truly lies in the opposite
approach, not granting easy divorces but rather making the citizenry understand that
marriage should not be taken lightly and no religion has intended for people to marry
anybody, just to be married, as Pope Shenouda has suggested in an Al-Ahram Weekly
interview; ―For Pope Shenouda, the whole debate about divorce tends to put the cart
before the horse. He believes that one of the main reasons many couples end up
seeking a divorce is because people fail to choose their partner wisely in the first
place. This is where the Church can be of most use, in preventing such mismatches,
not in effecting a singularly destructive and painful form of cure. (…) Thus the Coptic
Church is presently considering a project for a marriage school, where young single
men and women can learn (…) how to behave after marriage and how to solve
problems (…). We (the church) haven't established this school yet, but we have
organised (sic!) seminars. Priests are supposed to visit families regularly, as well, and
they have a role to play in conflict resolution.‖228
Such a project and approach would go hand in hand with changing
understandings in society on unmarried women especially, but maybe this could be an
approach to solve these issues and controversies, at least for now, with which all
forces: church, state, laity could live with. Changing religious laws, on either side,
does not seem possible in the near future and so it might be smart to look for other
228
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ways around in the meantime. Of course, this approach and attitude does not solve the
controversial issues and choices the Coptic citizen faces in the case of divorce and
Coptic PSL and their application. The double standards in the debate of citizenship
remain and divorces will continue to be issued, with the effect of contradicting, valid
judgments of the exact same case. There is the possibility of the unified Christian PSL
code, which could truly solve some of the issues of the present situation, especially
the converting and reconverting and the contradicting judgments. Pope Shenouda
himself has propagated this law repeatedly and he actually does have a point in doing
so, as it would close key loopholes of today‘s system.
However, it is my belief, that without a dialogue between the church and the
state, the issues and controversies of Coptic citizenship in general and Coptic divorce
in particular, will remain. In order to solve these issues and difficulties the Coptic
citizen faces because of the power struggles between the two entities that call
themselves responsible for him, cooperation and dialogue must be once again taken up
by both, to ensure a peaceful ―Co-existence (which) depends on balanced dialogue
between all concerned parties, whether as individuals or groups.‖229 It would only
then be believable that both church and state truly grasp their responsibilities, and that
they are not acting out of the desire to remain in power but to prove that they are
deserving of this power. This again is connected to their responsibilities the party
about whom the struggle is in the end regarding, the Coptic citizen.
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